Skills/PyPI/af-jupyterhub-mcp

af-jupyterhub-mcp@0.2.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for launching and driving per-user JupyterHub servers on the ATLAS Analysis Facility" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher maniaclab · publishing for 94 daysInstalls 572Last detonated 21 min ago
$claude mcp add af-jupyterhub-mcp -- uvx af-jupyterhub-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso cluster.local, uchicago.edu — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx af-jupyterhub-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.1.0

vet-skills diff af-jupyterhub-mcp 0.1.0 0.2.1

This version reaches for something 0.1.0 did not: 2 new hosts (cluster.local, uchicago.edu). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
cluster.local, uchicago.edu

0.1.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/af_jupyterhub_mcp/hub/proxy.py:11 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networktools/call); jupyter-mcp-server runs with ``stateless_http=True``, so eachFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_chart.py:76 · Python subprocess execution detectedrendered = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration.pre-commit-config.yaml:4 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeautoupdate_schedule: "monthly"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/docs.yml:49 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod -c -R +rX "site/" | while read line; doFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,141 tok
2 files · 72 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.