Skills/PyPI/af-filesystem-mcp

af-filesystem-mcp@0.3.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for per-user, impersonated filesystem access on the AF platform" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher maniaclab · publishing for 94 daysInstalls 281Last detonated 20 min ago
$claude mcp add af-filesystem-mcp -- uvx af-filesystem-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx af-filesystem-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.2.0

vet-skills diff af-filesystem-mcp 0.2.0 0.3.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.2.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.2.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration.pre-commit-config.yaml:4 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeautoupdate_schedule: "monthly"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/af_filesystem_mcp/paths.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestarget of an escape would otherwise be world-readable (e.g. ``/etc/passwd``)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/helper/test_ops.py:135 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesops.stat_path(root, "../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_secure_open.py:120 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessecure_open_confined(root, "/etc/passwd", os.O_RDONLY)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/tools/test_stat_path.py:97 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresult = await fs_stat(root="home", path="../../etc/passwd", ctx=mock_ctx)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/tools/test_grep_files.py:61 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert "log.txt (1 matches)" in outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/helper/test_ops.py:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert by_name["escaping-link"]["target"] == "/etc/passwd"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/tools/test_list_dir.py:59 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert "notes.txt" in outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_paths.py:96 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# POSIX-world-readable (e.g. /etc/passwd): confinement is a statedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/tools/test_grep_files.py:108 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert "secret.txt" not in outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_paths.py:144 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslink.symlink_to("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/tools/test_stat_path.py:74 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(home_root / "alice" / "link").symlink_to("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_secure_open.py:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestarget.symlink_to("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_paths.py:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesresolve_confined(root, "/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/docs.yml:49 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod -c -R +rX "site/" | while read line; doFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_paths.py:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(root / "passwd").symlink_to("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/tools/test_list_dir.py:98 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(home_root / "alice" / "escape").symlink_to("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/tools/test_stat_path.py:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert "target: /etc/passwd" in outputFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/tools/test_list_dir.py:144 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert "private.txt" not in outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/tools/test_list_dir.py:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert "[symlink] escape -> /etc/passwd" in outputFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/helper/test_ops.py:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(root / "escaping-link").symlink_to("/etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/tools/test_list_dir.py:79 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert "results.csv" in outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/contributing.md:58 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileroots), so tool tests exercise the actual helper subprocess without needing rootFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,099 tok
2 files · 72 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.