Skills/PyPI/adaptorch-mcp

adaptorch-mcp@0.6.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Installable MCP bridge for AdaptOrch" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher dmae97 · publishing for 72 daysInstalls 762Last detonated 15 min ago
$claude mcp add adaptorch-mcp -- uvx adaptorch-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ADAPTORCH_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN or --api-token / --http-auth-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: ADAPTORCH_CONTROL_PLANE_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
adaptorch.com (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ADAPTORCH_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN and talks to adaptorch.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets ADAPTORCH_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN=adaptorch.com -- uvx adaptorch-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.5.2

vet-skills diff adaptorch-mcp 0.5.2 0.6.2

This version reaches for something 0.5.2 did not: 1 new host (adaptorch.com) · 1 new credential variable (ADAPTORCH_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
adaptorch.com
New credential variables
ADAPTORCH_CONTROL_PLANE_TOKEN

0.5.2 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_wrapper.py:125 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/adaptorch_mcp/stdio_smoke.py:169 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_diagnostics_and_smoke.py:179 · Dynamic module loadingrunpy.run_module("adaptorch_mcp.__main__", run_name="__main__")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_discovery_catalog.py:39 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_wrapper.py:147 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking["--transport", "stdio", "--base-url", "https://user:[email protected]"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/adaptorch_mcp/thin_runtime.py:82 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_thin_remote.py:150 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_verification_diagnostic_flow.py:208 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_diagnostics_and_smoke.py:107 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking{"ADAPTORCH_CONTROL_PLANE_BASE_URL": "https://user:[email protected]/path"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
Dynamic module loadingsrc/adaptorch_mcp/diagnostics.py:82 · Dynamic module loadingspec = importlib.util.find_spec(import_name)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_docs_truth.py:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files*sorted((REPO_ROOT / "examples").glob("*.env.example")),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_hardening.py:90 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationtests/test_wrapper.py:164 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimedef test_cli_missing_remote_configuration_returns_helpful_error(Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_docs_truth.py:148 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor path in sorted((REPO_ROOT / "examples").glob("*.env.example")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈46 tok
1 file · 78 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.