activecollab-mcp@1.24.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for ActiveCollab — exposes projects, tasks, comments, attachments, and time tracking to MCP-compatible LLM clients." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- activecollab.com (its own)Also efront.com.au, placeholder.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to activecollab.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.23.0
vet-skills diff activecollab-mcp 1.23.0 1.24.1In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.23.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
1.23.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"""Tool names listed in `var`, from the environment or a local `.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.this key behaves exactly like every other setting: `.env` is honoured, andFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.@click.option("--skip-auto-update", is_flag=True, help="Skip the auto-update prompt.")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.ACTIVECOLLAB_MCP_REPO_URL env > stored config > PyPI default.Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.Auto-update via cronFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time._ok(f"Daily auto-update already enabled (cron: {st0.schedule})")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.have silently ignored the `.env` entry the sample file documents.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.@click.option("--auto-status", "auto_status", is_flag=True, help="Print whether the auto-update cron is registered.")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.env_file=(".env",),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._ok(f"Auto-update enabled (cron: {st1.schedule})")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."""Load settings from env + .env, falling back to the credentials file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# 4. Daily auto-update cron.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."""Runtime configuration. Read from .env or process environment.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env_file=(".env",),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return AutoUpdateStatus(enabled=False, schedule=None, command=None)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.install_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.retry_result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return AutoUpdateStatus(enabled=True, schedule=schedule, command=cmd)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return AutoUpdateStatus(enabled=False, schedule=None, command=None)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.' { "mcpServers": { "activecollab": { "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8787/mcp" } } }'Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim devjtv: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Sends the whole process environment out≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.