Skills/PyPI/accountlens-mcp

accountlens-mcp@0.5.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for querying AccountLens analytics data from Claude Desktop" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 730 daysInstalls 348Last detonated 11 min ago
$claude mcp add accountlens-mcp -- uvx accountlens-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ACCOUNTLENS_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: ACCOUNTLENS_EMAIL, ACCOUNTLENS_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso mapmycustomers.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mapmycustomers.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ACCOUNTLENS_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx accountlens-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.2.0

vet-skills diff accountlens-mcp 0.2.0 0.5.0

This version reaches for something 0.2.0 did not: 1 new host (mapmycustomers.io) · 1 new credential variable (ACCOUNTLENS_PASSWORD). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
mapmycustomers.io
New credential variables
ACCOUNTLENS_PASSWORD

0.2.0 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 95/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 564 lines in 14 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.