superpowers@7.0.2
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Superpowers teaches Claude brainstorming, subagent driven development with built in code review, systematic debugging, and red/green TDD. Additionally, it teaches Claude how to author and test new skills." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
context-safety rules you must follow. Use the recorded meanings rather thanFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.chmod 600 "$SERVER_ID_FILE" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill -0 "$1" 2>/dev/null || return 1Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if ! kill -0 "$SERVER_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$old_pid" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill -9 "$pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.5. Make executable: `chmod +x test-<skill-name>.sh`Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if ! kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.log(`\nOutput: ${outputDir}/`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…e same dispatch is also surfaced as a chat-syntax shortcut: typing `@generalist <prompt>` is equivalent to calling `invoke_agent` with `agent_name: "generalist"`. Built…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.