sanity@1.0.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Sanity content platform integration with MCP server, agent skills, and slash commands. Query and author content, build and optimize GROQ queries, design schemas, and set up Visual Editing." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Claude Code plugin marketplacePublisher sanity-io · joined 0 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
$/plugin install sanity@claude-plugins-official
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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectionskills/sanity-best-practices/references/localization.md:28 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measuresFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecommands/deploy-schema.md:52 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecommands/deploy-schema.md:21 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionskills/content-modeling-best-practices/SKILL.md:22 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measuresFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecommands/deploy-schema.md:32 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecommands/typegen.md:15 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/sanity-migration/SKILL.md:59 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageskills/sanity-migration/references/strapi.md:33 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/sanity-studio-upgrade/SKILL.md:166 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07