hookify@0.1.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Easily create custom hooks to prevent unwanted behaviors by analyzing conversation patterns or from explicit instructions. Define rules via simple markdown files." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Claude Code plugin marketplacePublisher anthropics · joined 5 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedcommands/help.md:168 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscommands/hookify.md:117 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscommands/hookify.md:149 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscommands/help.md:130 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsagents/conversation-analyzer.md:75 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/writing-rules/SKILL.md:327 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/writing-rules/SKILL.md:179 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/writing-rules/SKILL.md:82 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/writing-rules/SKILL.md:76 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandagents/conversation-analyzer.md:82 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedskills/writing-rules/SKILL.md:274 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedcore/rule_engine.py:297 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscommands/hookify.md:174 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandskills/writing-rules/SKILL.md:250 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcommands/help.md:88 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim anthropics: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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