Skills/Claude Code plugins/google-cloud-storage

google-cloud-storage@1.1.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Official Google Cloud Storage (GCS) plugin. Manage buckets and objects, transfer data, and configure MCP, FUSE, IAM, security, lifecycle rules, signed URLs, Terraform, and the CLI." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry Claude Code plugin marketplacePublisher gemini-cli-extensions · joined 1 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Rule modification attempt; Prompt injection; Prompt injection. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Rule modification attemptskills/google-cloud-storage-basics/references/iac-usage.md:90 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionskills/gcs-security-assessment/references/toxic_combinations.md:336 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionskills/google-cloud-storage-basics/references/mcp-usage.md:124 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionskills/gcs-security-assessment/references/saif_risk_factors.md:34 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measuresFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionskills/gcs-security-assessment/references/toxic_combinations.md:335 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/gcs-security-assessment/scripts/cloud_rest_helpers_nodeps.py:147 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/gcs-security-assessment/scripts/cloud_rest_helpers_nodeps.py:308 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageskills/google-cloud-storage-basics/references/gcsfuse.md:308 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Rule modification attemptskills/google-cloud-storage-basics/references/iac-usage.md:79 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/google-cloud-storage-basics/SKILL.md:116 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

What would make this Verified

22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim gemini-cli-extensions: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
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