crowdstrike-falcon-fusion@1.4.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "CrowdStrike Falcon Fusion skills for authoring, deploying, and executing Fusion workflows. Includes live action discovery, YAML authoring with schema validation, workflow import and release, execution monitoring, and Falcon Next-Gen SIEM lookup files." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 64/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
echo " # or: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh && uv python install 3.13"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo " curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh && uv python install 3.13"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo " # or: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh && uv python install 3.13"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo " sudo add-apt-repository ppa:deadsnakes/ppa && sudo apt update"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.<summary><strong>Install from a local clone</strong> (for development or testing a branch)</summary> ```bash git clone https://github.com/CrowdStrike/fusion-skiFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.python get_lookup.py --name "blocklist.csv" --output file.csv # Save to fileFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# Record the origin first, so a kill right after the move can still be undone.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo " sudo apt install python3.13 python3.13-venv"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.[[ "$platform" == "debian" ]] && echo "Try: sudo apt install python3.13-venv" >&2Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.python create_lookup.py --file data.csv # Upload (filename from path)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.python convert_catalog_to_yaml.py INPUT.json [-o OUTPUT.yaml]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.not through the chat. Do **not** ask them to paste the secret into the chat.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.python verify_lookup.py --file blocklist.csv --keep --json # keep the file, JSON outputFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.chmod 700 ~/.cache/crowdstrike-falcon-fusionFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 600 ~/.cache/crowdstrike-falcon-fusion/credentials.tomlFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.echo " curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh && uv python install 3.13"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo " # or: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh && uv python install 3.13"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo " # or: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh && uv python install 3.13"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# deleted, so a bug or a kill can strand an entry in the stash but can neverFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Record first, so a kill anywhere below leaves enough behind to undo it.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo " sudo dnf install python3.13"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.python verify_lookup.py --file blocklist.csv # upload, verify, deleteFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
16 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim crowdstrike: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.