Skills/npm/ziggs-mcp

ziggs-mcp@0.41.11

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Claude Code, Cursor, and other MCP hosts — act as your Ziggs delegate agent" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher ziggs-ai · publishing for 155 daysInstalls 11,935Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add ziggs-mcp -- npx -y @ziggs-ai/ziggs-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Needs
ZIGGS_OPERATOR_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code; at startup it asked for ZIGGS_OPERATOR_KEY
Where it talks to
ziggsai.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable and talks to ziggsai.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @ziggs-ai/ziggs-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for ZIGGS_OPERATOR_KEY); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 48 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
8.2sprocessdependency install exit 0
28sprocessrelaunched with a decoy ZIGGS_OPERATOR_KEY (tagged; nothing real)
48sclaimedstartup only: exited before answering, asking for ZIGGS_OPERATOR_KEY (a decoy value was refused)
48sprocessscript backend runs setup only
48sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/config.js:107 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// HTTP_URL inside resolveDelegateCreds, so a dev checkout's .env cannotFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/config.d.ts:27 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* one-minute task starting `npx @ziggs-ai/ziggs-mcp` — is a new host everyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:38 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/config.js:29 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* one-minute task starting `npx @ziggs-ai/ziggs-mcp` — is a new host everyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Prompt injectionexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:46 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file1. Turn developer mode on. On an individual account: **Settings → Security andFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:21 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file| Plus | developer mode; write support not stated on both of OpenAI's pages | assume read-only until you see otherwise |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:77 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file| ChatGPT | remote OAuth (custom MCP app, developer mode) | yes, 2026-08-13: writes need a Business/Enterprise/Edu plan |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:62 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…ness / Enterprise / Edu get the write tools (beta); Pro gets read/fetch only in developer mode, and Plus is not stated consistently by OpenAI, so treat it as read-only. Web o…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:20 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file| Pro | developer mode, read/fetch only | the read tools |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:21 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| Plus | developer mode; write support not stated on both of OpenAI's pages | assume read-only until you see otherwise |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:92 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…Fix | |---------|--------------|-----| | No option to add a custom MCP server | Developer mode off, or the plan does not include custom MCP | Turn on developer mode (Settings…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:77 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| ChatGPT | remote OAuth (custom MCP app, developer mode) | yes, 2026-08-13: writes need a Business/Enterprise/Edu plan |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:46 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file1. Turn developer mode on. On an individual account: **Settings → Security andFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:62 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file…ness / Enterprise / Edu get the write tools (beta); Pro gets read/fetch only in developer mode, and Plus is not stated consistently by OpenAI, so treat it as read-only. Web o…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:20 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| Pro | developer mode, read/fetch only | the read tools |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:47 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction filelogin → Developer mode**. On a workspace plan this is an admin setting ratherFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:92 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file…Fix | |---------|--------------|-----| | No option to add a custom MCP server | Developer mode off, or the plan does not include custom MCP | Turn on developer mode (Settings…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageexamples/chatgpt-remote-oauth.md:47 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction filelogin → Developer mode**. On a workspace plan this is an admin setting ratherFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,732 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @ziggs-ai/ziggs-mcp@0.41.11 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.