zalo-mcp@2.1.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Zalo Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server Integration" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, nodejs.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.0.9
vet-skills diff zalo-mcp 2.0.9 2.1.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.0.9 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 27 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
if [ ! -f .env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if npm install @ardennguyen/zalo-mcp@latest --no-save >/dev/null 2>&1; thenFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.const envPath = path.join(__dirname, '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod +x ./zalo-mcp.sh 2>/dev/nullFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.if ! npm install @ardennguyen/zalo-agent-cli@latest; thenFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.// Load environment variables from local .env if it existsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.cp .env.example .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# 4. Copy and Configure .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod +x "$INSTALL_DIR/$FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ardennguyen: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unpinned dependencies≈ +3 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Unpinned dependency≈ +1 on the totalPin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.