Skills/npm/xeer-mcp

xeer-mcp@0.2.41

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Xeer project context, diagnostics, scaffold, check, test, dev, build, and preview deployment." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher impetik · publishing for 118 daysInstalls 1,356Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add xeer-mcp -- npx -y @impetik/xeer-mcp
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
xeer.run (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable and talks to xeer.run, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @impetik/xeer-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.2.40

vet-skills diff xeer-mcp 0.2.40 0.2.41

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.2.40 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.2.41 was run less far than 0.2.40 (startup only vs full); behavior past startup is not compared. Only one of the two runs produced a tool list; tools are not compared.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 37 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
17sprocessdependency install exit 0
37sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-nCXfZH/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/xeer-mcp/vendor/spec/template-distribution.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
37sprocessscript backend runs setup only
37sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsvendor/spec/actions.js:741 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringhumanPrerequisites: ['A human must deliberately provide the secret value.'],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsvendor/spec/actions.d.ts:1174 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringreadonly humanPrerequisites: readonly ["A human must deliberately provide the secret value."];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionvendor/spec/admin-sql.js:7 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files* constraints bind *every* writer, not only `ctx.db` — `UPDATE posts SET position = 'abc'` is refusedFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionvendor/spec/admin-sql.d.ts:7 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files* constraints bind *every* writer, not only `ctx.db` — `UPDATE posts SET position = 'abc'` is refusedFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈68 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @impetik/xeer-mcp@0.2.41 as of 28 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.