wso2-docs-mcp-server@1.3.16
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Production-ready MCP server providing RAG-based access to WSO2 documentation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DATABASE_URLGEMINI_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYVOYAGE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CACHE_TTL_SECONDS, CHUNK_OVERLAP, CHUNK_SIZE, CRAWL_CONCURRENCY, EMBEDDING_DIMENSIONS, EMBEDDING_PROVIDER, GEMINI_EMBEDDING_MODEL, HUGGINGFACE_EMBEDDING_MODEL, MCP_SERVER_NAME, MCP_SERVER_VERSION, OLLAMA_BASE_URL, OLLAMA_EMBEDDING_MODEL, OPENAI_EMBEDDING_MODEL, TOP_K_RESULTS, VOYAGE_EMBEDDING_MODEL- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso wso2.com, ballerina.io, voyageai.com, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names wso2.com, ballerina.io, voyageai.com, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DATABASE_URL, GEMINI_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, VOYAGE_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 41 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* Dynamic schema migration — respects EMBEDDING_DIMENSIONS from .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.'User-Agent': 'WSO2-Docs-MCP-Server/1.1 (+https://github.com/iamvirul/wso2-docs-mcp-server)',Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.-- npx -y wso2-docs-mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for wso2-docs-mcp-server@1.3.16 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.