wigolo@0.3.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Local-first web intelligence MCP server for AI coding agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
WIGOLO_LLM_API_KEYWIGOLO_SERVE_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATEDor--allow-unauthenticatedConfiguration, not credentials: GITHUB_ACTIONS, TLS_BROWSER_PATTERN, WIGOLO_CONFIG_PATH, WIGOLO_DOCTOR_INPROC, WIGOLO_FIRECRAWL_COMPAT, WIGOLO_LLM_MODEL, WIGOLO_PLUGIN_AUTO_YES, WIGOLO_SEARCH, WIGOLO_SEARXNG_URL, WIGOLO_SERVE_ALLOW_LOCAL_TARGETS, WIGOLO_TUI_MODE, WIGOLO_TUI_REDUCED_MOTION, WIGOLO_WAIT_FOR_INDEX- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for WIGOLO_LLM_API_KEY, WIGOLO_SERVE_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 14 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
out(" Hint: on disk but will not launch \u2014 reinstall: 'npx playwright install chromium'");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.out(" Hint: system libraries missing \u2014 run: sudo npx playwright install-deps chromium");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.claude mcp add wigolo -- npx wigoloFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.<summary><b>Free? What's the catch?</b></summary> No catch by design. The expensive parts (ranking, embeddings, the browser engine) run on *your* hardware, so tFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.out(" Hint: system libraries missing \u2014 run: sudo npx playwright install-deps chromium");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.sudo npx playwright install-deps ${browser}Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.<summary><b>Is the quality really on par with the paid services?</b></summary> The benchmark section above is a live 4-way run you can reproduce: everyday agentFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.install: npx wigoloFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.<summary><b>Why 1.5 GB of disk?</b></summary> That's the on-device brain: a full browser engine plus the ranking and embedding models the cloud services run on Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.return `python3 venv module not available. On Debian/Ubuntu, run: sudo apt install ${pkg}${suffix}. Search will use the built-in core backend until this is fixed.`;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.npx wigolo warmup --all # also installs Firefox, WebKit, ML reranker, and embeddingsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx wigolo warmup --force # wipe search engine state and rebuildFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx wigolo warmup # installs browser engine + bootstraps search engineFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.out(` - Force retry now: npx wigolo warmup --force`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.out(" status: not bootstrapped \u2014 run `npx wigolo warmup`");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.reporter.note(" claude mcp add wigolo --scope user -- npx wigolo");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.sudo npx playwright install-deps ${browser}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const hint = err.hint ?? "npx playwright install chromium";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.log(`Start it with: npx wigolo serve`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.out(` ${chalk.gray("Point your MCP client at: npx wigolo mcp")}`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* land on stdout, which the old `stderr || stdout` dropped whenever the npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.browserEngine: "re-run `wigolo warmup --all`, or `npx playwright install chromium`",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.`Cannot --force: another wigolo bootstrap is in progress (pid ${lock.pid}). Kill it first: kill ${lock.pid}`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell." .json on|off Toggle newline-delimited JSON output for tool results",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for wigolo@0.3.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim knockoutez: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.