Skills/npm/wicked-crew

wicked-crew@0.17.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "The harness for the coding agents you already use: runs Claude Code, Codex, GitHub Copilot, OpenCode and Pi in sandboxes. By default a different agent reviews the work, and built-in feature, bug-fix, migration, MCP-server and editor-plugin jobs are accept" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher mikeparcewski · publishing for 129 daysInstalls 9,235Last detonated 7d ago
$claude mcp add wicked-crew -- npx -y wicked-crew
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try wicked-crew` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.9sprocessdependency install exit 1
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
1.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
1.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/mcp/probe.js:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (config.auth?.env !== undefined && secret !== null)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/api/server.js:449 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesapp.log.warn(`[state-home] the post-skills survey failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/api/mcp.js:399 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesport: body.sql.port ?? (body.sql.driver === 'postgres' ? 5432 : 3306),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/apps/turns.js:376 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesthis.log(`[apps] turn ${input.runId} of ${input.app} launched on v${input.base}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/apps/turns.js:209 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files'- A query: `id` (lower-case, also its file name), `source`, `kind` (`sql` for a postgres, mysql or sqlite source, its text in `queries/<id>.sql`; `graphql` for a graphql source, the document in `querFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/apps/git.js:236 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions* replaced, never followed). Nothing is ever done THROUGH the existing entry (codex r4: no chmod of it).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/apps/git.d.ts:71 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions* replaced, never followed). Nothing is ever done THROUGH the existing entry (codex r4: no chmod of it).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/api/routes.d.ts:631 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* spawning a real `npx wicked-interactive serve`. */Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/apps/turns.js:487 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesthis.log(`[apps] turn ${input.runId} of ${input.slug} was refused at ${refused.phase}; its run was stopped`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/api/server.js:1432 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesapp.log.info('interactive-chat subscription armed (filter wicked.interactive.chat.posted)');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/api/auth.js:154 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionswarn(`[auth] ${path} is group/world-accessible (mode ${(statSync(path).mode & 0o777).toString(8)}) — chmod 600 recommended`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/cli/index.js:442 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// engine's in-memory kill handles die with the daemon) and the interactive bridge treesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/core/exec.js:25 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// silent kill and an OOM.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli/index.js:281 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconsole.error(`[crew] interactive bridge: npx ${interactive.spec} (${interactive.source === 'env' ? `${INTERACTIVE_SPEC_ENV} override` : 'default range'})` +Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/cli/index.js:553 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Live sweep (crew#340): kill -9 on a bridge mid-run orphans its worker CLI NOW, andFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/skills/refs.js:92 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// `$(wicked-garden path <dir>)`, optionally `npx wicked-garden@12 run …`. Masked out of a lineFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli/service.js:221 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codedeps.log('wicked-crew: refusing to install a login service that runs from the npx cache (it is not durable). ' +Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli/service.js:248 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdeps.log(`wicked-crew: 127.0.0.1:${input.port} is already held by ${who}, which is not the login service. ` +Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/cli/service.js:249 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes'Stop it first (a hand-started daemon: its terminal, or `kill <pid>`), then run `wicked-crew serve --install-service` again.');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/skills/refs.js:26 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* bundle (`go test ./...`, `npx @axe-core/cli`, `python3 tests/x.py`) isFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/skills/tree.js:772 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions/* not ours to chmod — rmSync below reports what matters */Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/skills/tree.js:328 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions* edit needs a `chmod +w` that moves ctime and mode; a root-forged ctime is the stated gap.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈100 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for wicked-crew@0.17.1 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.