whatsapp-mcp@1.0.2
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Production-grade Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp Web powered by Baileys" Observed in sandbox: sends data to 2a03:2880:f36e:120:face:b00c:0:167, 57.144.221.32.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
WHATSAPP_AUTH_DIRConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_TRANSPORT, WHATSAPP_DATA_DIR, WHATSAPP_DB_FILE, WHATSAPP_LOGS_DIR, WHATSAPP_MEDIA_DIR, WHATSAPP_ROOT_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso whatsapp.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · contacted 2a03:2880:f36e:120:face:b00c:0:167, 57.144.221.32 (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted 2a03:2880:f36e:120:face:b00c:0:167, 57.144.221.32, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: sends data to 2a03:2880:f36e:120:face:b00c:0:167, 57.144.221.32.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 37 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
dotenv.config({ path: path.join(WORKSPACE_ROOT, ".env") });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.dotenv.config({ path: path.join(WORKSPACE_ROOT, ".env") });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @ahmadmcer/whatsapp-mcp@1.0.2 as of 40 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ahmadmcer: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.