vlc-mcp-server@0.1.2
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Control VLC Media Player through the Model Context Protocol." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
VLC_HTTP_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, VLC_BASE_URL, VLC_HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS, VLC_HTTP_USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for VLC_HTTP_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 23 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 574 lines in 6 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for vlc-mcp-server@0.1.2 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.