Skills/npm/vault-ask

vault-ask@0.2.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Request and send secrets for AI agents, end-to-end encrypted and never shown in the chat." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher erseni · publishing for 30 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 10d ago
$claude mcp add vault-ask -- npx -y @erseni/vault-ask
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
VAULT_ASK_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: VAULT_ASK_SERVER, XDG_STATE_HOME
Where it talks to
erseni.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for VAULT_ASK_API_KEY and talks to erseni.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets VAULT_ASK_API_KEY=erseni.com -- npx -y @erseni/vault-ask

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/mcp.js:83 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: { type: 'string', description: 'Also write NAME=value into this .env file (permissions 600)' },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/mcp.js:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: { type: 'string', description: 'Write NAME=value lines into this .env file' },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/mcp.js:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…kes it from a file or an environment variable), can write the same value into a .env file, a file or one command so that the system and the user end up with the sam…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/cli.js:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files--env-file <path> Write NAME=value lines into a .env file (permissions 600)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/mcp.js:17 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…n API-Key für X", "use my token": call request_secret to have it written into a .env file or a file, or run_with_secret to run exactly one command with it. Never as…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/mcp.js:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files+ 'Asks the user for one or more secrets and writes them into a .env file or a file, without the values ever passing through this conversation. 'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/cli.js:203 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesthrow new Error('Name the value, for example vault-ask send DB_PASSWORD ' + (options.target.kind === PURPOSE_COMMAND ? '-- <command>' : '--env-file .env'));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/targets.js:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst childEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈72 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @erseni/vault-ask@0.2.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.