Skills/npm/ton-mesh-harness

ton-mesh-harness@0.13.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "TON Mesh Harness — one-command CLI + MCP server to deploy a static site to .ton (TON Storage + .ton DNS + ADNL), self-host first, agent-callable. CLI, MCP server (4 tools), and a programmable SDK on one deploy contract." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher github actions · joined 8 days agoInstalls 30Last detonated 7d ago

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtemplates/github-workflow-agentic.yml:55 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/mesh-deploy.md:77 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetemplates/github-workflow-agentic.yml:5 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressdist/sdk/schemas.d.ts:217 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressdist/sdk/schemas.d.ts:622 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalskills/mesh-deploy.md:66 · Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalFix: Declare and request only the permissions the task needs.
AST02
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressdist/sdk/schemas.d.ts:217 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressdist/sdk/schemas.d.ts:622 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalskills/mesh-deploy.md:72 · Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalFix: Declare and request only the permissions the task needs.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/daemon/installer-utils.d.ts:9 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/mesh-deploy.md:241 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtemplates/github-workflow-agentic.yml:58 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetemplates/github-workflow.yml:44 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetemplates/github-workflow-agentic.yml:67 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim github actions: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval≈ +4 on the totalDeclare and request only the permissions the task needs.
  3. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
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