ton-mesh-harness@0.13.1
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "TON Mesh Harness — one-command CLI + MCP server to deploy a static site to .ton (TON Storage + .ton DNS + ADNL), self-host first, agent-callable. CLI, MCP server (4 tools), and a programmable SDK on one deploy contract." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim github actions: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval≈ +4 on the totalDeclare and request only the permissions the task needs.
- Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.