tokensafe@4.4.2
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Your AI agent is smart enough to code all day. Now it actually can. Local runtime firewall & zero-loss context optimizer for AI coding agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYDEEPSEEK_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYTOKENSAFE_AGENTTOKENSAFE_ALLOWED_ORIGINSTOKENSAFE_AUTOPRUNE_INTERVALTOKENSAFE_BG_LICENSE_KEYTOKENSAFE_BUNDLE_MAX_TOKENSTOKENSAFE_CACHE_TIMEOUTTOKENSAFE_CLOUD_DISTILLTOKENSAFE_CLOUD_URLTOKENSAFE_CONTEXT_WINDOWTOKENSAFE_DATA_DIRTOKENSAFE_DB_PATHTOKENSAFE_GRAPH_DISK_CACHETOKENSAFE_GRAPH_TTLTOKENSAFE_HMAC_SALTTOKENSAFE_HOSTTOKENSAFE_LICENSE_KEYTOKENSAFE_LIVE_FLUSH_SECONDSTOKENSAFE_LIVE_URLTOKENSAFE_MAX_EVENTSTOKENSAFE_MAX_TURN_TOKENSTOKENSAFE_MCP_AUTORELOADTOKENSAFE_MCP_TIMEOUTTOKENSAFE_NONINTERACTIVETOKENSAFE_PRIVATE_KEYTOKENSAFE_PROXY_DISABLEDTOKENSAFE_PUBLIC_KEYTOKENSAFE_RETENTION_DAYSTOKENSAFE_SELF_HOSTEDTOKENSAFE_STALE_GUARDTOKENSAFE_TARGET_TURN_TOKENSTOKENSAFE_TELEMETRY_DISABLEDTOKENSAFE_TEST_PROMPTTOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_ALLOWLISTTOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_KEEPTOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNINGTOKENSAFE_TREESITTERor--claim-token- Where it talks to
- tokensafe.dev (its own)Also deepseek.com, python.org, z.ai, apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names deepseek.com, python.org, z.ai, apple.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, DEEPSEEK_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, TOKENSAFE_AGENT, TOKENSAFE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, TOKENSAFE_AUTOPRUNE_INTERVAL, TOKENSAFE_BG_LICENSE_KEY, TOKENSAFE_BUNDLE_MAX_TOKENS, TOKENSAFE_CACHE_TIMEOUT, TOKENSAFE_CLOUD_DISTILL, TOKENSAFE_CLOUD_URL, TOKENSAFE_CONTEXT_WINDOW, TOKENSAFE_DATA_DIR, TOKENSAFE_DB_PATH, TOKENSAFE_GRAPH_DISK_CACHE, TOKENSAFE_GRAPH_TTL, TOKENSAFE_HMAC_SALT, TOKENSAFE_HOST, TOKENSAFE_LICENSE_KEY, TOKENSAFE_LIVE_FLUSH_SECONDS, TOKENSAFE_LIVE_URL, TOKENSAFE_MAX_EVENTS, TOKENSAFE_MAX_TURN_TOKENS, TOKENSAFE_MCP_AUTORELOAD, TOKENSAFE_MCP_TIMEOUT, TOKENSAFE_NONINTERACTIVE, TOKENSAFE_PRIVATE_KEY, TOKENSAFE_PROXY_DISABLED, TOKENSAFE_PUBLIC_KEY, TOKENSAFE_RETENTION_DAYS, TOKENSAFE_SELF_HOSTED, TOKENSAFE_STALE_GUARD, TOKENSAFE_TARGET_TURN_TOKENS, TOKENSAFE_TELEMETRY_DISABLED, TOKENSAFE_TEST_PROMPT, TOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_ALLOWLIST, TOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_KEEP, TOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNING, TOKENSAFE_TREESITTER only into requests to tokensafe.dev (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 4.3.1
vet-skills diff tokensafe 4.3.1 4.4.2In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 4.3.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 55/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Coercive compliance language; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 21 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
# 1. Destructive Unbounded File Deletion (rm -rf /, rm -rf ~, rm -rf *, etc.)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.When interacting within this environment, you MUST follow strict token economy guidelines:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.… }, "secret_guard": { "note": "Security scenario: a pre-registered FAKE .env fixture is written into the temp clone (values are synthetic, never real secret…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Features a resilient /dev/tty fallback for piped 'curl | bash' installations and anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Ignores heavy folders (node_modules, dist, .git, etc.) and redacts sensitive files (.env*).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.'.env', '.env.local', '.env.production', '.env.staging', '.env.development'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r'|(?:\.env(?:\.[\w\-]+)?|\.gitignore|\.dockerignore|\.prettierrc[\w\.\-]*|\.eslintrc[\w\.\-]*|\.npmignore|\.npmrc|\.yarnrc)'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.5. Git Staging Protection for Sensitive Files (.env*, *.key, *.pem)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.r"rm\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*\s+)*-?[rf]{2,}[a-zA-Z]*\s+(--\s+)?/(?:\s|$)", # rm -rf /Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r"rm\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*\s+)*-?[rf]{2,}[a-zA-Z]*\s+(--\s+)?/(?:\s|$)", # rm -rf /Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.error(' Debian: sudo apt-get install python3\n');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.".env", ".env.local", ".env.production", ".env.staging", ".env.development",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.6. Destructive Shell Command & Unbounded Deletion Prevention (rm -rf /)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.env_path = os.path.join(root, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.… without permissions, timestamps, or ignored folders (node_modules, .git, dist, .env). Replaces verbose ls -la. Pass '.' for project root or a subfolder like 'src'.…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Rule: Token-Optimized Communication Protocol (TOCP) Trigger: always_onFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.…)\nDATABASE_URL=postgres://admin:[email protected]:5432/prod\nAPI_KEY=sk-live-4c9a1f77e2b34d08a91c6d5e7f0b2a3d\nJWT_SECRET=9f3b1c77e2b34d08a91c6d5e7f0b2a3d9f3b\nSTRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET=whsec_5…Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "venv", venv_dir],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(["git", "pull", "--quiet"], cwd=PROJECT_ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "daemon-reload"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r"""process\.env(?:\.([A-Za-z0-9_]+)|\[\s*['"]([A-Za-z0-9_]+)['"]\s*\])\s*(?:\|\||\?\?)\s*['"`]([^'"`\n]+)['"`]""",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.probe = subprocess.run([py, "-c", "import pytest_asyncio"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["launchctl", "unload", plist_path], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(["launchctl", "load", "-w", plist_path], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "--depth", depth, "-q", repo["url"], dest],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.count = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-list", "--count", "HEAD"], cwd=root,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.startfile(out_path) # type: ignore[attr-defined]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."dockerfile", "dockerfile.cloud", "docker-compose.yml", ".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.res = subprocess.run([pip_cmd, "list"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["xdg-open", out_path], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "diff", "HEAD~1", "HEAD"], cwd=root,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.up_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "fetch", "--depth", depth, "origin"], cwd=dest,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(py_args, cwd=root, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", timeout=300)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=PROJECT_ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.capped = subprocess.run(rewritten, shell=True, cwd=root,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", "grep", "-n", pattern, "--", search_dir],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["open", out_path], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["launchctl", "unload", plist_path], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(sub_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "reset", "--hard", "-q", "origin/HEAD"], cwd=dest,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "disable", "--now", cls._SERVICE_NAME], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([venv_py, "-m", "pip", "install", "-q", "pytest", *deps, "-e", repo_root],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# 2. TypeScript compiler & type-checking commands (tsc, npx tsc, npm run typecheck)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.lines.append(" \033[36m💡 Tip: Consolidate redundant rule files into a single AGENTS.md\033[0m")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.tokensafe test "<prompt>" Preview prompt compaction on custom inputFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.subprocess.run(sync_cmd, env=sync_env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.print(f" {CYAN}→{RESET} Updating global npm package via {npm_bin} (npm install -g tokensafe@latest)...")Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.p = subprocess.Popen(zenity_cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# 3. Linter commands (eslint, npx eslint, biome, npx biome)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.if importlib.util.find_spec("pytest") is None:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.* Works with `npx tokensafe [command]` or global `tokensafe [command]`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return True, "ZCode hooks registered in ~/.zcode/cli/config.json (SessionStart + UserPromptSubmit + PreToolUse guard + PostToolUse compact + Stop) — restart the app to take effect"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.res = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=2)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.up_res = subprocess.run([pip_cmd, "install", "--upgrade", "tokensafe"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(term)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Features a resilient /dev/tty fallback for piped 'curl | bash' installations and anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
25 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.tokensafe/venv/pyvenv.cfg, ~/.tokensafe/venv/bin/python3._pth, ~/.tokensafe/venv/lib/python3.11/site-packages.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tokensafe-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.