Skills/npm/tokensafe

tokensafe@4.4.2

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Your AI agent is smart enough to code all day. Now it actually can. Local runtime firewall & zero-loss context optimizer for AI coding agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher tokensafe-dev · publishing for 14 daysInstalls 23,179Last detonated 20 min ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYDEEPSEEK_API_KEYGEMINI_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYTOKENSAFE_AGENTTOKENSAFE_ALLOWED_ORIGINSTOKENSAFE_AUTOPRUNE_INTERVALTOKENSAFE_BG_LICENSE_KEYTOKENSAFE_BUNDLE_MAX_TOKENSTOKENSAFE_CACHE_TIMEOUTTOKENSAFE_CLOUD_DISTILLTOKENSAFE_CLOUD_URLTOKENSAFE_CONTEXT_WINDOWTOKENSAFE_DATA_DIRTOKENSAFE_DB_PATHTOKENSAFE_GRAPH_DISK_CACHETOKENSAFE_GRAPH_TTLTOKENSAFE_HMAC_SALTTOKENSAFE_HOSTTOKENSAFE_LICENSE_KEYTOKENSAFE_LIVE_FLUSH_SECONDSTOKENSAFE_LIVE_URLTOKENSAFE_MAX_EVENTSTOKENSAFE_MAX_TURN_TOKENSTOKENSAFE_MCP_AUTORELOADTOKENSAFE_MCP_TIMEOUTTOKENSAFE_NONINTERACTIVETOKENSAFE_PRIVATE_KEYTOKENSAFE_PROXY_DISABLEDTOKENSAFE_PUBLIC_KEYTOKENSAFE_RETENTION_DAYSTOKENSAFE_SELF_HOSTEDTOKENSAFE_STALE_GUARDTOKENSAFE_TARGET_TURN_TOKENSTOKENSAFE_TELEMETRY_DISABLEDTOKENSAFE_TEST_PROMPTTOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_ALLOWLISTTOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_KEEPTOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNINGTOKENSAFE_TREESITTER or --claim-token
Where it talks to
tokensafe.dev (its own)Also deepseek.com, python.org, z.ai, apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names deepseek.com, python.org, z.ai, apple.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, DEEPSEEK_API_KEY, GEMINI_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, TOKENSAFE_AGENT, TOKENSAFE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, TOKENSAFE_AUTOPRUNE_INTERVAL, TOKENSAFE_BG_LICENSE_KEY, TOKENSAFE_BUNDLE_MAX_TOKENS, TOKENSAFE_CACHE_TIMEOUT, TOKENSAFE_CLOUD_DISTILL, TOKENSAFE_CLOUD_URL, TOKENSAFE_CONTEXT_WINDOW, TOKENSAFE_DATA_DIR, TOKENSAFE_DB_PATH, TOKENSAFE_GRAPH_DISK_CACHE, TOKENSAFE_GRAPH_TTL, TOKENSAFE_HMAC_SALT, TOKENSAFE_HOST, TOKENSAFE_LICENSE_KEY, TOKENSAFE_LIVE_FLUSH_SECONDS, TOKENSAFE_LIVE_URL, TOKENSAFE_MAX_EVENTS, TOKENSAFE_MAX_TURN_TOKENS, TOKENSAFE_MCP_AUTORELOAD, TOKENSAFE_MCP_TIMEOUT, TOKENSAFE_NONINTERACTIVE, TOKENSAFE_PRIVATE_KEY, TOKENSAFE_PROXY_DISABLED, TOKENSAFE_PUBLIC_KEY, TOKENSAFE_RETENTION_DAYS, TOKENSAFE_SELF_HOSTED, TOKENSAFE_STALE_GUARD, TOKENSAFE_TARGET_TURN_TOKENS, TOKENSAFE_TELEMETRY_DISABLED, TOKENSAFE_TEST_PROMPT, TOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_ALLOWLIST, TOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_KEEP, TOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNING, TOKENSAFE_TREESITTER only into requests to tokensafe.dev (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=tokensafe.dev,DEEPSEEK_API_KEY=tokensafe.dev,GEMINI_API_KEY=tokensafe.dev,OPENAI_API_KEY=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_AGENT=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_AUTOPRUNE_INTERVAL=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_BG_LICENSE_KEY=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_BUNDLE_MAX_TOKENS=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_CACHE_TIMEOUT=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_CLOUD_DISTILL=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_CLOUD_URL=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_CONTEXT_WINDOW=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_DATA_DIR=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_DB_PATH=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_GRAPH_DISK_CACHE=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_GRAPH_TTL=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_HMAC_SALT=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_HOST=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_LICENSE_KEY=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_LIVE_FLUSH_SECONDS=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_LIVE_URL=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_MAX_EVENTS=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_MAX_TURN_TOKENS=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_MCP_AUTORELOAD=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_MCP_TIMEOUT=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_NONINTERACTIVE=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_PRIVATE_KEY=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_PROXY_DISABLED=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_PUBLIC_KEY=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_RETENTION_DAYS=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_SELF_HOSTED=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_STALE_GUARD=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_TARGET_TURN_TOKENS=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_TEST_PROMPT=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_ALLOWLIST=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNE_KEEP=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_TOOL_PRUNING=tokensafe.dev,TOKENSAFE_TREESITTER=tokensafe.dev -- npx -y tokensafe

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 4.3.1

vet-skills diff tokensafe 4.3.1 4.4.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 4.3.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 55/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Coercive compliance language; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 21 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sfilesystemread ~/.tokensafe/venv/pyvenv.cfg · ~/.tokensafe/venv/bin/python3._pth · ~/.tokensafe/venv/lib/python3.11/site-packages · ~/.tokensafe/venv outside project
20sfilesystemwrote ~/.tokensafe/venv/pyvenv.cfg
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · ⚡ Installing TokenSafe dependencies (cryptography & tree-sitter AST grammars)... ❌ TokenSafe requires Python 3.10+ and 'cryptography>=42.0'. Install dependencies manually via: pip install 'cryptography>=42.0' 'tree-sitter>=0.23' 'tree-sitter-python'
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/guard.py:341 · Destructive file system command detected# 1. Destructive Unbounded File Deletion (rm -rf /, rm -rf ~, rm -rf *, etc.)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Coercive compliance languagerules/AGENTS.md:8 · Coercive compliance languageWhen interacting within this environment, you MUST follow strict token economy guidelines:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/bench_scenarios.json:318 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files… }, "secret_guard": { "note": "Security scenario: a pre-registered FAKE .env fixture is written into the temp clone (values are synthetic, never real secret…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/installer.py:1096 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFeatures a resilient /dev/tty fallback for piped 'curl | bash' installations and anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server.py:401 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesIgnores heavy folders (node_modules, dist, .git, etc.) and redacts sensitive files (.env*).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server.py:414 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'.env', '.env.local', '.env.production', '.env.staging', '.env.development'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/compactor.py:271 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr'|(?:\.env(?:\.[\w\-]+)?|\.gitignore|\.dockerignore|\.prettierrc[\w\.\-]*|\.eslintrc[\w\.\-]*|\.npmignore|\.npmrc|\.yarnrc)'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/guard.py:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files5. Git Staging Protection for Sensitive Files (.env*, *.key, *.pem)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicesrc/adapter_core.py:59 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicer"rm\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*\s+)*-?[rf]{2,}[a-zA-Z]*\s+(--\s+)?/(?:\s|$)", # rm -rf /Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/adapter_core.py:59 · Destructive file system command detectedr"rm\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*\s+)*-?[rf]{2,}[a-zA-Z]*\s+(--\s+)?/(?:\s|$)", # rm -rf /Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandbin/tokensafe.js:150 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesconsole.error(' Debian: sudo apt-get install python3\n');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/guard.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env", ".env.local", ".env.production", ".env.staging", ".env.development",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/guard.py:9 · Destructive file system command detected6. Destructive Shell Command & Unbounded Deletion Prevention (rm -rf /)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/benchmark_real.py:683 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = os.path.join(root, ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server.py:233 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files… without permissions, timestamps, or ignored folders (node_modules, .git, dist, .env). Replaces verbose ls -la. Pass '.' for project root or a subfolder like 'src'.…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentrules/AGENTS.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentRule: Token-Optimized Communication Protocol (TOCP) Trigger: always_onFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Stripe-like API key pattern detectedsrc/bench_scenarios.json:319 · Stripe-like API key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested key…)\nDATABASE_URL=postgres://admin:[email protected]:5432/prod\nAPI_KEY=sk-live-4c9a1f77e2b34d08a91c6d5e7f0b2a3d\nJWT_SECRET=9f3b1c77e2b34d08a91c6d5e7f0b2a3d9f3b\nSTRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET=whsec_5…Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:200 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "venv", venv_dir],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:2438 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(["git", "pull", "--quiet"], cwd=PROJECT_ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/guard.py:704 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:977 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "daemon-reload"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/secret_redactor.py:122 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"""process\.env(?:\.([A-Za-z0-9_]+)|\[\s*['"]([A-Za-z0-9_]+)['"]\s*\])\s*(?:\|\||\?\?)\s*['"`]([^'"`\n]+)['"`]""",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:334 · Python subprocess execution detectedprobe = subprocess.run([py, "-c", "import pytest_asyncio"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:968 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["launchctl", "unload", plist_path], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:932 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(["launchctl", "load", "-w", plist_path], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:163 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "clone", "--depth", depth, "-q", repo["url"], dest],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:497 · Python subprocess execution detectedcount = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-list", "--count", "HEAD"], cwd=root,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli.py:353 · Python subprocess execution detectedos.startfile(out_path) # type: ignore[attr-defined]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:229 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/scoped_search.py:47 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"dockerfile", "dockerfile.cloud", "docker-compose.yml", ".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:2495 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run([pip_cmd, "list"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli.py:355 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["xdg-open", out_path], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:504 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(["git", "diff", "HEAD~1", "HEAD"], cwd=root,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:2470 · Python subprocess execution detectedup_res = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:956 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:157 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "fetch", "--depth", depth, "origin"], cwd=dest,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:340 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(py_args, cwd=root, capture_output=True, text=True, encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", timeout=300)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli.py:1246 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=PROJECT_ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:730 · Python subprocess execution detectedcapped = subprocess.run(rewritten, shell=True, cwd=root,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:1063 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:465 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(["git", "grep", "-n", pattern, "--", search_dir],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli.py:351 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["open", out_path], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/image_downscale.py:188 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/image_downscale.py:174 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/image_downscale.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:2271 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:931 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["launchctl", "unload", plist_path], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/cli.py:1171 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(sub_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:159 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "reset", "--hard", "-q", "origin/HEAD"], cwd=dest,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:975 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "disable", "--now", cls._SERVICE_NAME], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/benchmark_real.py:208 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([venv_py, "-m", "pip", "install", "-q", "pytest", *deps, "-e", repo_root],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:2460 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/command_sanitizer.py:640 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# 2. TypeScript compiler & type-checking commands (tsc, npx tsc, npm run typecheck)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/environment_auditor.py:607 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filelines.append(" \033[36m💡 Tip: Consolidate redundant rule files into a single AGENTS.md\033[0m")Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagREADME.md:456 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction filetokensafe test "<prompt>" Preview prompt compaction on custom inputFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:2543 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(sync_cmd, env=sync_env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependencysrc/installer.py:2469 · Unpinned dependencyprint(f" {CYAN}→{RESET} Updating global npm package via {npm_bin} (npm install -g tokensafe@latest)...")Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/version_checker.py:450 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/version_checker.py:308 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(zenity_cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/telemetry_sync.py:573 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/command_sanitizer.py:660 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# 3. Linter commands (eslint, npx eslint, biome, npx biome)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Dynamic module loadingsrc/benchmark_real.py:311 · Dynamic module loadingif importlib.util.find_spec("pytest") is None:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/version_checker.py:331 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/tokensafe.js:5 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* Works with `npx tokensafe [command]` or global `tokensafe [command]`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/installer.py:406 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn True, "ZCode hooks registered in ~/.zcode/cli/config.json (SessionStart + UserPromptSubmit + PreToolUse guard + PostToolUse compact + Stop) — restart the app to take effect"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_proxy.py:99 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/version_checker.py:262 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/license_manager.py:117 · Python subprocess execution detectedres = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=2)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/installer.py:2498 · Python subprocess execution detectedup_res = subprocess.run([pip_cmd, "install", "--upgrade", "tokensafe"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/version_checker.py:320 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(term)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/installer.py:1096 · Remote installer piped to shellFeatures a resilient /dev/tty fallback for piped 'curl | bash' installations and anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/version_checker.py:288 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,511 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

25 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.tokensafe/venv/pyvenv.cfg, ~/.tokensafe/venv/bin/python3._pth, ~/.tokensafe/venv/lib/python3.11/site-packages.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tokensafe-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  5. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  6. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim tokensafe-devPropose a patch to the maintainer