Skills/npm/token-optimizer-mcp

token-optimizer-mcp@7.10.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Audit net MCP context avoided per AI coding agent, optimize context, and share a live local knowledge graph across 16 CLI clients" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher ooples · publishing for 380 daysInstalls 15,611Last detonated 32 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_DAEMON_IDLE_MSTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_MODETOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXYTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_ACCOUNTINGTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_CAPTURETOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_CORE_TOOLSTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_DEFER_HOLDOUTTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_DROP_THINKINGTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_KEEP_TOOLSTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_KEEPWARM_MARGIN_MSTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_KNOWLEDGE_CHARSTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_NULLTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_PREFETCHTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_SMALL_TOOL_CHARSTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_SPILLTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_UPSTREAMTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SETTINGSTOKEN_OPTIMIZER_UPDATE_CHECKConfiguration, not credentials: CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, SOCKET_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso elsewhere.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names elsewhere.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_DAEMON_IDLE_MS, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_MODE, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_ACCOUNTING, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_CAPTURE, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_CORE_TOOLS, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_DEFER_HOLDOUT, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_DROP_THINKING, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_KEEP_TOOLS, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_KEEPWARM_MARGIN_MS, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_KNOWLEDGE_CHARS, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_NULL, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_PREFETCH, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_SMALL_TOOL_CHARS, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_SPILL, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_PROXY_UPSTREAM, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_SETTINGS, TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_UPDATE_CHECK only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @ooples/token-optimizer-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 52 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
31sprocessdependency install exit 0
51sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-D9NKUZ/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/token-optimizer-mcp/dist/server/cli-dispatch.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
51sprocessscript backend runs setup only
52sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
52sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/rollout/cli.js:165 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst seeded = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:2525 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Click to expand</summary> System-level operations with smart caching: - **smart_cron** - Scheduled task management (cron/Windows Task Scheduler) (85% rFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddist/learn/analyze.js:112 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges* discarded the rest of `sudo -E env FOO=1 python script.py` and left nothing thisFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:2496 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Click to expand</summary> Comprehensive monitoring with 88-92% token reduction through intelligent caching: - **alert_manager** - Multi-channel alertinFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:2345 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Click to expand</summary> - **optimize_text** - Compress and cache text (primary tool for token reduction) - **get_cached** - Retrieve previously cacheFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:2549 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Click to expand</summary> - **intelligent-assistant** - Context-aware assistance with compact recommendations - **natural-language-query** - Natural-laFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:62 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"!**/.env.*"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:2464 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Click to expand</summary> Enterprise-grade caching strategies with 87-92% token reduction: - **smart_cache** - Multi-tier cache (L1/L2/L3) with 6 evictFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:2402 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Click to expand</summary> Intelligent caching and optimization for external data sources: - **smart_api_fetch** - HTTP requests with caching and retry Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:2373 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Click to expand</summary> Optimized replacements for standard file tools with intelligent caching and diff-based updates: - **smart_read** - Read filesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:2434 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Click to expand</summary> Development workflow optimization with intelligent caching: - **smart_build** - TypeScript builds with diff-based change deteFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/proxy/server.js:1603 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsthrow new Error(`token-optimizer proxy: refusing to forward credentials to ${upstream} -- ` +Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:726 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentPROSE-CLAIMS:START -- every percentage in the prose between this marker and its END must also appear inside a guarded block above, or be declared in the registrFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/proxy/cli.js:262 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// ANSWERING A QUESTION IS NOT RUNNING, so this sits above the kill switch andFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Image alt text carrying instructionsREADME.md:1895 · Image alt text carrying instructionsCodex MCP list showing token-optimizer installed and enabledFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:61 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"!**/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/server/daemon.js:9 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* Performance: ~2-5ms per request (IPC overhead) vs ~1000-4000ms (npx spawn overhead)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesREADME.md:2002 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileadd the recommendations from [`integrations/AGENTS.md`](./integrations/AGENTS.md)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/update/cli.js:11 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* an npx cache entry, a Claude Code plugin, a source checkout, and an installFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/update/apply.js:77 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codereturn ('this copy is an npx cache entry, which is replaced rather than upgraded: ' +Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/doctor.mjs:132 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(' Upload is a separate opt-in: TOKEN_OPTIMIZER_BEACON=1');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/update/apply.js:10 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* next `npx -y <pkg>@latest` fetches the newer one. Running that commandFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/proxy/server.js:218 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* and `Buffer.concat` over a stream nobody bounded is an out-of-memory kill with noFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/proxy/server.js:2132 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// only chance to record the tail of the window; a kill loses it, whichFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/proxy/server.js:2122 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// used to kill immediately, so a clean stop dropped the tail of the ledgerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/update/cli.d.ts:11 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* an npx cache entry, a Claude Code plugin, a source checkout, and an installFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/server/daemon.js:363 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconsole.error(`[DAEMON] Stop it first if you meant to restart: kill ${running}`);Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/proxy/enabled.js:12 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/** Enabled by default; explicit opt-outs and the global kill switch win. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesREADME.md:1901 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file…nd hooks The plugin supplies both automatically. For an MCP-only installation, add the guidance from [`integrations/AGENTS.md`](./integrations/AGENTS.md) to a project or global `AGENTS.md`. A ready-made standalone hook is also avail…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈74 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @ooples/token-optimizer-mcp@7.10.0 as of 30 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ooples: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ooplesPropose a patch to the maintainer