tebra-mcp-server@0.2.5
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for Tebra/Kareo practice management — patients, billing, scheduling, FHIR (45 tools)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- TEBRA_SOAP_PASSWORD, TEBRA_CUSTOMER_KEY — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TEBRA_FHIR_CLIENT_SECRETTEBRA_FHIR_TOKEN_URLTEBRA_SOAP_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: TEBRA_CUSTOMER_KEY, TEBRA_FHIR_BASE_URL, TEBRA_FHIR_CLIENT_ID, TEBRA_SOAP_DEBUG, TEBRA_SOAP_ENDPOINT, TEBRA_SOAP_USER- Where it talks to
- tebra.com (its own)Also kareo.com, xmlsoap.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names kareo.com, xmlsoap.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TEBRA_FHIR_CLIENT_SECRET, TEBRA_FHIR_TOKEN_URL, TEBRA_SOAP_PASSWORD only into requests to tebra.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for TEBRA_SOAP_PASSWORD, TEBRA_CUSTOMER_KEY); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 45 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
'Set these in your environment or .env file before starting the MCP server.');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* npx @allure-md/tebra-mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx @allure-md/tebra-mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for tebra-mcp-server@0.2.5 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.