tandoor-recipes-mcp@3.4.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Tandoor — recipes, meal plans, shopping lists, ingredients, cook logs, nutrition, AI import, and more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try tandoor-recipes-mcp` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// into reading sensitive paths (~/.ssh/id_rsa, /etc/shadow, $HOME/.aws/credentials)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.error("Error: TANDOOR_URL must be set in .env file (or set the plugin's Tandoor URL setting)");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// into reading sensitive paths (~/.ssh/id_rsa, /etc/shadow, $HOME/.aws/credentials)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.console.error("Error: TANDOOR_URL and TANDOOR_TOKEN must be set in .env file (or set the plugin's Tandoor URL and Tandoor API Token settings)");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// into reading sensitive paths (~/.ssh/id_rsa, /etc/shadow, $HOME/.aws/credentials)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const remoteConfig = { ...config, _meta: { securitySchemes: [{ type: 'oauth2', scopes: ['tandoor'] }] } };Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// Threat: a prompt-injected LLM is fed a URL like `http://169.254.169.254/...`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// unrecoverable for THIS request, so kill it and let the next callFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.server.registerTool(name, isRemoteMode() ? remoteConfig : config, cb);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."mcpb": "npx --yes @anthropic-ai/[email protected]",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// Threat: a prompt-injected LLM is fed a URL like `http://169.254.169.254/...`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @cliftonz/tandoor-recipes-mcp@3.4.0 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cliftonz: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.