Skills/npm/taintproof

taintproof@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Claude Code security review skill that proves a vulnerability is exploitable before reporting it." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher ficcc · publishing for 13 daysInstalls 361Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Bidirectional text override characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedscripts/intel_common.py:20 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentINVISIBLE = re.compile("[\x00-\x1f\x7f-\x9f​-‏
-‮⁠-⁤]")Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run-semgrep.py:66 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/taintproof.js:16 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst HELP = `Usage: npx taintproofFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Bidirectional text override characters detectedscripts/intel_common.py:20 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content directionINVISIBLE = re.compile("[\x00-\x1f\x7f-\x9f​-‏
-‮⁠-⁤]")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,657 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for taintproof@1.0.0 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ficcc: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  3. Bidirectional text override characters detected≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ficccPropose a patch to the maintainer