taiga-api-mcp-server@0.5.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for Taiga — read and manage your own Taiga projects from any MCP client" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- TAIGA_PASSWORD, TAIGA_APP_TOKEN, TAIGA_AUTH_TOKEN, TAIGA_REFRESH_TOKEN, --no-token-cache — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code; at startup it asked for TAIGA_PASSWORD, TAIGA_APP_TOKEN, TAIGA_AUTH_TOKEN, TAIGA_REFRESH_TOKEN, --no-token-cache
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso taiga.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed (it asks for TAIGA_PASSWORD, TAIGA_APP_TOKEN, TAIGA_AUTH_TOKEN, TAIGA_REFRESH_TOKEN); the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 52 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 5,157 lines in 6 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for taiga-api-mcp-server@0.5.0 as of 20 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.