system-design-primer-skill@2.4.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "A portable System Design Agent Skill with evidence-first task routing, architecture design and review, distributed systems, security, data platforms, AI systems, observability, performance, networking, and resilience." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 8 of 26 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: README links to an external installer. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
https://github.com/jack-001-a/system-design-primer-skill/archive/refs/heads/main.zipFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.extract = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.verify = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.request_result = subprocess.run(request_command, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…and fault intensity; require authorization, independent abort monitoring, and a kill switch. Validate data integrity, detection, containment, recovery, and reconcili…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…that would invalidate it. Use the evaluation cases in `evals/system-design-cases.json` as regression prompts when changing routing or output behavior. ### Execution protocol 1. **Classify before expanding scope.** Sele…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.chmod +x "$staging/scripts/"*.sh "$staging/scripts/"*.py 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for system-design-primer-skill@2.4.0 as of 6 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jack-001-a: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- README links to an external installer≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.