superlocalmemory@4.2.17
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "The governed memory brain for AI agents: one local memory for Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Copilot, ChatGPT and any MCP client. Honest recall, documents and pictures, roles, audit and GDPR erasure." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso pytorch.org, python.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
`codex-plugin/AGENTS.md` are not written for you: append them to your `AGENTS.md`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Codex reads `AGENTS.md` from the repo root. Append the contents of `codex-plugin/AGENTS.md`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.`HALT` (a bound tripped), `PAUSE` (approval pending), `KILLED` (kill switch),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.`HALT` (a bound tripped), `PAUSE` (approval pending), `KILLED` (kill switch),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.lines.push('Ubuntu 22.04: sudo add-apt-repository ppa:deadsnakes/ppa && sudo apt install python3.12 python3.12-venv');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.| `KILLED` | The external kill switch tripped between laps. |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.lines.push('Debian 13 / Ubuntu 24.04 and later: sudo apt install python3 python3-venv');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.## [4.2.2] — Recall never refuses answers it has after a model change, and "What am I working on?" answers from your workFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.### 1 — Append the SLM rules to your `AGENTS.md`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.completed = subprocess.run([binary, *argv], text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=30, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- **Saves under heavy load are accepted and saved**, never refused. A save theFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.completed = subprocess.run([binary, "--version"], text=True, capture_output=True, timeout=5, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.console.log('Usage: node scripts/postinstall.js');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.- **kill switch** — a non-empty `SLM_LOOP_KILL` in the loop's processFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…eceipt; failures keep the evidence and retry; text saves under load are queued, never refused | [Architecture](https://github.com/qualixar/superlocalmemory/blob/main/docs/A…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.lines.push('Fedora / RHEL 9: sudo dnf install python3.12');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for superlocalmemory@4.2.17 as of 27 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.