summarizing-meetings@1.0.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Agent skill: turn a raw meeting transcript (Granola, Zoom, Meet, any ASR) into a clean record and a follow-up with action items." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// Usage: npx @vstlmkh/summarizing-meetings [--dir <skills-dir>] [--force]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.deadline. Soft commitments inflate the list and kill trust in it.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.console.log(`Usage: npx @vstlmkh/${SKILL_NAME} [--dir <skills-dir>] [--force]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Me: ok. let me take a look. actually no better let Dan build the prototype on the workerFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.Me: ok. let me take a look. actually no better let Dan build a prototypeFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.**Actions.** @Dan — prototype — by 24.10Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.someone absent is not acceptance — flag it: `@Dan (not on the call)`.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."The prototype action item is owned by Dan, not Mark, despite Mark first saying 'let me take a look'",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.out of the decisions list), the reassignment from Mark to Dan (the owner changedFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.**Participants:** Anna, Mark, DanFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.…es, migration of legacy orders ESM-15410. Participants: Mark (Me), Anna (Them), Dan is mentioned but was not on the call. Meeting date 17.10.2026. Cleaned transcri…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."Dan is marked as not having been on the call, since he never accepted the task",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.- [ ] @Dan — build a retry prototype on the worker — by 24.10Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.**Mark.** Let's have Dan build a prototype instead.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."The Anna action item carries the explicit date 20.10, while the Dan item marks 'by next week' as an unfixed deadline",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.| 1 | Retry prototype on the worker | Dan | 24.10 |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.