ssh-mcp@2.27.1
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "MCP server exposing policy-gated, audited SSH access for Linux and Windows hosts via the Model Context Protocol." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SSH_AUTH_SOCKSSH_MCP_PASSWORDSSH_MCP_SUDO_PASSWORDor--bearertokenConfiguration, not credentials: MAX_REMOTE_PATH_CHARS, RESERVED_BINDING_KEYS, SSH_MCP_DISABLE_MAIN, SSH_MCP_KEY, SSH_MCP_PASSPHRASE, SSH_MCP_TEST, SystemRoot, USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SSH_AUTH_SOCK, SSH_MCP_PASSWORD, SSH_MCP_SUDO_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.26.0
vet-skills diff ssh-mcp 2.26.0 2.27.1In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.26.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
Tool descriptor hashes were not recorded for both runs; renamed or added tools are compared, rewritten descriptions are not.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Reads credential paths from the home directory; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 37 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
// regex refused any substring, so `echo 'rm -rf /'` and a grep quotingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* `break`-on-close reading as a bypass: `> ""~/.ssh/authorized_keys` fell through).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `rm -rf /tmp/build` must not also approve `rm -rf /tmp/build-prod`.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Device formatters and wipers: any `mkfs` spelling — `mkfs.ext4 /dev/sda1`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* empty part between them, and this deliberately still matches: `curl x || sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.* `find` can carry `operandsAreData: true` while `find … -exec sudo id +` isFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// runtime's SIGKILL. Teardown is concurrent now, so the honest ceiling is one killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// (`curl -d @/etc/passwd`), and write remote files (`curl -o`, `wget -O`) —Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.export const PATH_CONTROL_CHARS = /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f-\u009f\u061c\u200b\u200e\u200f\u2028-\u202e\u2060-\u2064\u2066-\u2069\ufeff]/;Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.* /"` prints a string, and normalising it produced `echo hello; rm -rf /`, which matchedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// getline` runs `sudo id`, and reading only the last literal classifiedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// sudo id` then never splits on the `;` and the elevation disappears, which measured asFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* profile nothing new: `cat /etc/shadow` and `ls /root` are already `read-only`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* an accepted — reader past `safe` (`sort -o /tmp/x /etc/passwd` isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `chmod 600` it prescribed could not lift that rejection — measured on Windows 11,Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.// classifier never looked at — `env sudo rm -f /etc/passwd` classifiedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// classifier never looked at — `env sudo rm -f /etc/passwd` classifiedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* `read-command "-c sftp:download /etc/shadow"` resolved to binaryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// `uniq /etc/passwd /root/.ssh/authorized_keys`; GNU's own usage line isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `kill -TERM <pid>`, which is outside this namespace and cannot be reserved —Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// of the transfer that wrote it, and a root shaped like ~/.ssh turns the sameFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.`Required: 0700. Run: chmod 700 ${dir}\n` +Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* by taking the *higher* class — so `/tmp/x; sudo id` classifies `privileged`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* - a root shaped like `~/.ssh` turns the same two tools into "read the privateFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// The four operation rules that used to live here — `rm -rf /`, `mkfs…`,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// the same defect as the `chmod 600` this whole change replaced.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.`Required: 0600. Run: chmod 600 ${filePath}`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* anything that reads arguments by position: `awk -F '' 'BEGIN{system("sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// written for it stays in the pipe, and sudo exec's this `sh -c` withFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.{ path: join(homedir(), '.ssh'), reason: 'the SSH client directory (~/.ssh)' },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* `sftp:list /tmp sh -c 'sudo id'` fell from `privileged` to `read-only`,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.wrap: (cleanCmd) => `sudo -p "" -S sh -c ${shellSingleQuote(`exec 0</dev/null; ${cleanCmd}`)}`,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// gawk's indirect call (`f="system"; @f("sudo id")`) and its `@load` /Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// The sudo password is the one secret that can plausibly end up in thisFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// regex refused any substring, so `echo 'rm -rf /'` and a grep quotingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// spelling, and `rm -fr /` or `mkfs -t ext4 /dev/sda1` classified `safe` —Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// behind a teardown that now waits for kill ladders. Flushing first cannot lose a recordFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// `sudo -S` reads stdin only when it actually needs a password. UnderFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Measured: `print "x" | "id" "; sudo sh"` came out `safe`.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…-upload and run it by path.', 'privileged-command': 'Execute a command with sudo elevation. Goes through the approval gate; approvalPolicy on the profile decides…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// An McpServer binds to a single transport, so HTTP needs one per session.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.// classifier never looked at — `env sudo rm -f /etc/passwd` classifiedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Evaluate the bare command too: the sudo wrapper would otherwiseFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* `BEGIN{not=2; x = not / system("sudo id") / 3}` is a *division* that real awkFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// with no way to chmod a path baked into the image.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* One kill ladder (3s) plus slack. Sessions and connections close concurrently, so thisFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// before the command runs means sudo still gets its password from theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* `read-command "sftp:list /tmp sudo id"` and the classifier answeredFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* sudo and goes looking for a bigger role that does not exist (#91).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// Guarded and in a `finally`, both because closing now awaits a kill ladder ratherFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// count by as long as the kill ladder takes.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."build:coverage": "tsc --sourceMap && shx chmod +x build/*.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.// for its sessions' kill ladders, and serialising multiplied that wait by the number ofFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Render a CommandResult for the client. A non-zero exit (or a kill signal)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return runAudited(`kill -${signal} ${pid}`, { toolName: 'signal-process', failureClass: 'destructive', profile, extra, synthetic: true }, async (rt) => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* takes both `-r` and `-R`, while chmod and chown take only `-R` — lowercaseFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* `toClose`, unclosed: closing awaits session kill ladders, and the caller does it afterFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."build": "tsc && shx chmod +x build/*.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* bit are dropped rather than carried across. See the chmod below.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.// `iptables -F`, `chmod -R 777 /` — are segment checks in FORBIDDEN_RULESFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* literal head matches, so a command built from `dd curl wget chown -R x `Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* out of reach (documented residual). Measured in review: `chmod -R 777Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/ssh-mcp/config.toml.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tufantunc: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.