smtp-mcp-server@1.4.3
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for sending email via SMTP relay" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SMTP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SMTP_FROM_ADDRESS, SMTP_FROM_NAME, SMTP_HOST, SMTP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, SMTP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, SMTP_HTTP_HOST, SMTP_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES, SMTP_HTTP_PORT, SMTP_IGNORE_TLS, SMTP_PASS, SMTP_PORT, SMTP_READWRITE, SMTP_SECURE, SMTP_TRANSPORT, SMTP_USER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SMTP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.4.1
vet-skills diff smtp-mcp-server 1.4.1 1.4.3This version reaches for something 1.4.1 did not: 1 new credential variable (SMTP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New credential variables
- SMTP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN
1.4.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…Server)(createConfiguredServer, { host, port, serverName: "@teamnetwork-nz/smtp-mcp-server", bearerToken: process.env.SMTP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN, allowedHosts: process.env.SMTP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS?.split(",").map(v => v.trim()).filter(Boolean),…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.