smithsonian-mcp@2.2.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Smithsonian Open Access collections" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SMITHSONIAN_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: UV_PROJECT_ENVIRONMENT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso data.gov, si.edu, astral.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names data.gov, si.edu, astral.sh as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SMITHSONIAN_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.1.0
vet-skills diff smithsonian-mcp 2.1.0 2.2.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.1.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 22 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
' macOS/Linux: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh\n' +Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.// - Installed package (npx cache or a global install, which may sit under aFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// Load environment variables from a .env file in the current directory, if any.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Install with: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.* enabling npm/npx installation and execution with uv for dependency management.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Settings are read from environment variables, or from a ``.env`` file found byFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Install with: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.info("- Add it to .env file: SMITHSONIAN_API_KEY=your_key_here")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' macOS/Linux: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh\n' +Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.log('Or create a .env file in the working directory with: SMITHSONIAN_API_KEY=your_key_here');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @molanojustin/smithsonian-mcp@2.2.0 as of 31 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim molanojustin: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.