Skills/npm/simply-gitlab-mcp

simply-gitlab-mcp@0.11.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server exposing GitLab to AI agents, built on @simplysf/simply-gitlab-core" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher simplysf · publishing for 66 daysInstalls 1,467Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try simply-gitlab-mcp` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.8sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.9sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.9sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.9sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.9sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.9sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/context.d.ts:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* A `.env` file holding connection settings the host did not set. Loaded once, at startup,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/mcpClients/existingEntry.js:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envTable = `mcp_servers.${name}.env`;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathslib/commands/gitlab/mcp.js:66 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessummary: 'Path to a .env file holding connection settings.',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbin/run.js:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files' --env-file <path> A .env file holding connection settings the environment does not.',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandlib/tools.js:343 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions'and chmod needs "execute_filemode". Those rules are checked before anything is sent, so a ' +Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageoclif.manifest.json:143 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"description": "absolute: this Node binary and the simply CLI’s own script, which works for GUI clients that do not see your PATH (re-run with --force after a Node upgrade moves it). simply: \"simply\Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagelib/commands/gitlab/mcp/install.js:82 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code'right for a committed file. npx: "npx -y @simplysf/simply-cli", for machines without a global install.',Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsoclif.manifest.json:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"summary": "Path to a .env file holding connection settings.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈66 tok
1 file · 41 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @simplysf/simply-gitlab-mcp@0.11.0 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim simplysf: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim simplysfPropose a patch to the maintainer