server@3.10.7
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Reticle CLI, bridge and MCP server: a coding agent drives your running web app from the inside and gets a verdict with evidence, for change verification, access control, accessibility, performance and SEO checks." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso reticle.sh, nodejs.org, tauri.localhost, posthog.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 3.10.2
vet-skills diff server 3.10.2 3.10.7In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 3.10.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 27 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* A variable already present in the environment ALWAYS wins. A .env that overrode an explicitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Developing Reticle is not using Reticle. The `.env` carrying RETICLE_TELEMETRY=0 is gitignored,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…ools?** A client loads MCP servers only at start, so a prompt cannot add them. `npx @reticlehq/server init --relaunch` prints the command that resumes this conversation with the too…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* `process.env` from the project's .env AFTER every module has been imported, so a value captured atFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* The obvious incantation, `lsof -ti tcp:4400 | xargs kill -9`, also kills `reticle mcp`: the proxyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./** Strip one layer of matching quotes from a .env value. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.--license <key> write an enterprise key to .env and keep .env out of gitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./** How long after SIGKILL before we accept the process is not ours to kill and say so. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.: `pid ${String(pid)} survived SIGKILL, so it is not yours to kill (permissions) or is an ` +Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…e one with reticle_verify { action: "explore", persona: "<who does what>" }, or npx @reticlehq/server verify <url> --explore --persona "<who does what>"'; const ENV_FLAG = '--env'; …Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* `.env` is the convenient one and is useful to every user: put `RETICLE_TELEMETRY=0` in a project'sFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* The key, written to .env by the command rather than by hand.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* Load `<dir>/.env` into `env`. Best-effort and deliberately minimal — no expansion, no multiline.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.RETICLE_INSTALL_SOURCE=skill_file npx @reticlehq/server@latest initFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…ambiguity`, `feature_request`, `improvement`, `experience`. Tools unreachable? `npx @reticlehq/server feedback --agent --kind <kind> "what happened"`. A bug in the app under test is…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// `.env` — or in the repo root when the editor started inside the app — was never read, and theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* daemon that ignored SIGTERM until a human ran `kill -9` by hand, which is the moment the `lsof -ti`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.npx @reticlehq/server@latestFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* `process.env` from the project's .env AFTER every module has been imported, so a value captured atFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose./** `[email protected]:Acme/Web.git` / `https://u:[email protected]/Acme/Web` → `github.com/acme/web`. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// options — fold in a project-local `.env`. Values already in the environment always win.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* The instructions used to ask an agent for three steps: append to .env, check .gitignore, confirm.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.> Tell the maintainers what you build: Discord https://discord.gg/BwAbzv9ZRz, a call https://calendar.app.google/h9NRDbBBQetyTzWM6, or `npx @reticlehq/server feedback --contact [email protected] "..."`.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* `.env` and the daemon honours it. But `.env` is gitignored, so it exists only on the machine thatFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* Load `<dir>/.env` into `env`. Best-effort and deliberately minimal — no expansion, no multiline.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// tool result. That is the pair the user hits after `npm update`: a cached npx MCP packageFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* will happily fetch and run it. So the npx spelling leads every page.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* (npx pulled it in with the server) but its browser build is not, because that is a separateFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const HEAD = 'usage: reticle <command> (or npx @reticlehq/server <command>)';Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// `version_skew`, and the unpinned `npx @reticlehq/server` every agent entry uses resolves theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.`version instead: npx @reticlehq/server@${pin} restart`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* (npx pulled it in with the server) but its browser build is not, because that is a separateFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.// the race, and one kill on one well-known port was a machine-wide outage.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* not: `npx reticle` resolves the PACKAGE named `reticle`, which belongs to somebody else, and npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* Run directly rather than through the `npx playwright@<version>` the hint prints. They install theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* dialling a daemon npx served from cache. Advice naming the wrong component is worse thanFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.: reason.replace(/\.$/, '')}. Run \`npx @reticlehq/server connect\`.`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* then refused with "Chromium is not installed for Playwright. Run: npx playwright@… installFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* then refused with "Chromium is not installed for Playwright. Run: npx playwright@… installFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim reticlehq: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.