Skills/npm/server-everything

server-everything@2.3.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that exercises all the features of the MCP protocol" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher modelcontextprotocol · publishing for 726 daysInstalls 1.3MLast detonated 3d ago
$claude mcp add server-everything -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-everything
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
INCLUDE_SECRETS_VARConfiguration, not credentials: GZIP_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS, GZIP_ALLOWED_DOMAINS, GZIP_MAX_FETCH_SIZE, GZIP_MAX_FETCH_TIME_MILLIS
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects INCLUDE_SECRETS_VAR only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-everything

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 7 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.4sprocessdependency install exit 1 · (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) npm error Cannot read properties of null (reading 'edgesOut') npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-uzBcIK/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-11T10_36_47_780Z-debug-0.log
6.4sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
6.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
6.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/tools/get-env.js:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/transports/streamableHttp.js:164 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Received MCP POST request");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:25 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && shx cp -r docs dist/ && shx chmod +x dist/*.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 60 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @modelcontextprotocol/server-everything@2.3.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.