seo@0.17.1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "The SEO command for AI agents: a free Google Search Console MCP server and CLI. Reads your real Search Console, Google Analytics and Bing data for traffic drops, quick wins, content decay, cannibalization and indexing, plus DataForSEO and Ahrefs keyword r" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher iannuttall · publishing for 4648 daysInstalls 9,572Last detonated 3d ago
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run
Static findings
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:51 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files
AST07`)}function xo(e){let t=e.trim();if(/^https?:\/\//i.test(t))return t;if(t.startsWith(`sc-domain:`))return`https://${t.slice(10)}/`;if(/^[a-z0-9-]+(\.[a-z0-9-]+)+(:\d+)?(\/\S*)?$/i.test(t))return`httpsFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:48 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files
AST07`),await n.flush()}async function io(e,t){if(!e){await ro(process.stdout,t);return}await Dr(cr(e),{recursive:!0});let n=gr(e);try{await ro(n,t),n.end(),await Zr(n)}catch(e){throw n.destroy(),e}processFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:3 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files
AST07import{$ as e,$n as t,$t as n,A as r,An as i,At as a,B as o,Bn as s,Bt as c,C as l,Cn as u,Cr as d,Ct as f,D as ee,Dn as p,Dt as m,E as h,En as te,Et as ne,F as re,Fn as ie,Ft as ae,G as oe,Gn as se,GFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:32 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files
AST07`)}function Qi(e,t){return e.length===0?t.colors.dim(`No parameters.`):Yi(e.map(e=>({title:e.name,description:e.description,meta:[e.type,e.required?`required`:`optional`]})),t,{empty:`No parameters.`}Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.LOW
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:59 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file
AST01<summary><strong>The CLI</strong> (for crawls and Bing, which run on your machine)</summary> ```bash npm i -g seo seo start ``` `seo start` signs you in, connecFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli.js:59 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code
AST06`));else{if(await js())return n();Ds("The login expired. Run `seo login` again."),process.exitCode=1}}});async function js(){let e=dt()??await Le();for(Ds(`Opening ${e.url}\nApprove code ${e.code} theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:104 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files
AST07`),ia(`What is in it`,"An example site about parks, built from src/data. It already passes `seo site check`: titles, canonicals, JSON-LD, sharing images, Markdown copies, llms.txt and sitemaps are donFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/seo/SKILL.md:14 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code
AST06CLI: `seo`, or `npx -y seo`. Add `--json` for JSON.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/cli.js:57 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network
AST04`,config:{}};let t=vr(e.path,`utf8`),n=[],r=ei(t,n,{allowTrailingComma:!0});if(n.length>0){let t=n[0],r=t?`${ti(t.error)} at offset ${t.offset}`:`unknown parse error`;throw Error(`Cannot update ${e.paFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Instructions loaded
≈2,107 tok
2 files · 74 in bundle
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for seo@0.17.1 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.