Skills/npm/sbuilder-mcp

sbuilder-mcp@0.105.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server that designs and operates a Store Builder site — pages, data, theme and publish — through the platform's own API and live-edit protocol." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher vuluu2k · publishing for 78 daysInstalls 10,922Last detonated 38 h ago
$claude mcp add sbuilder-mcp -- npx -y sbuilder-mcp
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SB_PASSWORDSB_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: BUILTIN_APP_KEYS, FORM_TEMPLATE_KEYS, IMAGE_LIST_ITEM_BORDER_KEYS, LEGACY_HOVER_KEY, SB_API, SB_EMAIL, SB_SITE, SB_SITE_NAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SB_PASSWORD, SB_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y sbuilder-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 33 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
13sprocessdependency install exit 0
33sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-TPjECv/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/sbuilder-mcp/dist/catalog/api.generated.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
33sprocessscript backend runs setup only
33sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/transport/localfile.js:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* it exfiltrates (`~/.ssh/id_rsa` uploaded under `name:"x.png"` gets a public CDNFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorydist/transport/media.js:337 · References a credential file in the home directory// {path:"~/.ssh/id_rsa", name:"x.png"} uploads a key as an image to a publicFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorydist/transport/localfile.js:9 · References a credential file in the home directory* it exfiltrates (`~/.ssh/id_rsa` uploaded under `name:"x.png"` gets a public CDNFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/vision/imagediff.js:14 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// them), a launch deadline, and a pid noted so `release` can kill a stuck close.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/install/index.js:136 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code' npx -y sbuilder-mcp install --token wbk_… --api https://your-host\n');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/transport/media.js:337 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// {path:"~/.ssh/id_rsa", name:"x.png"} uploads a key as an image to a publicFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/vision/capture.js:1579 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// One unresolvable href must not kill the crawl.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈74 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for sbuilder-mcp@0.105.0 as of 37 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.