sandboxer-mcp@0.1.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Cloud Linux VMs for your agent: run code, Docker, files and HTTPS previews in a Sandboxer microVM." Observed in sandbox: calls sandboxer.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- sandboxer.com (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · reached only sandboxer.com (its own)
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Reasonable to connect. No credential asked for, no third-party host named, Server started and answered tools/list.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: calls sandboxer.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
No findings across 152 lines in 5 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for sandboxer-mcp@0.1.0 as of 8 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.