Skills/npm/rolewire-mcp

rolewire-mcp@1.3.2

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Rolewire Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Claude, Cursor, Antigravity, and AI agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher har777 · publishing for 35 daysInstalls 814Last detonated 11 min ago
$claude mcp add rolewire-mcp -- npx -y rolewire-mcp
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
rolewire.app (its own)
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Reasonable to connect. No credential asked for, no third-party host named, Server started and answered tools/list.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.3.0

vet-skills diff rolewire-mcp 1.3.0 1.3.2

This version reaches for something 1.3.0 did not: 2 rewritten tool descriptors (get_company_roles, search_jobs). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Rewritten tool descriptors
get_company_roles, search_jobs

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 27 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.3sprocessdependency install exit 0
26sclaimed5 tools: search_jobs, get_company_roles, get_job_detail, get_sectors, get_departments
26stools3b48f6f64c16e015
26stools8a2df234d367023b
26stools8ecc8d52af7e1931
26stools0b97a809adf15ba1
26stools3fb11afdb591172c
26sprocessscript backend runs setup only
26sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:29 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

No other findings across 546 lines in 5 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈59 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈681 tok
5 tools · 136 per tool
Handshake
390 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 128

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.