reaper-mcp@0.99.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for controlling REAPER DAW — real-time mixing, FX control, and frequency analysis for AI agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso huggingface.co — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.83.2
vet-skills diff reaper-mcp 0.83.2 0.99.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.83.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
"'sudo apt install libfluidsynth3' on Debian/Ubuntu. "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Hi 👋 reaper-mcp isn't a company — it's just me. I'm a developer who loves making music,Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.<summary><b>Prefer ReaPack for the REAPER side?</b></summary> In REAPER: **Extensions → ReaPack → Import repositories…**, paste `https://github.com/mthines/reapFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.<summary><b>Can it wreck my project?</b></summary> <br> Every edit is a single undo step, and the mix skills snapshot before and after a task. Use <code>/critiqFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.<summary><b>Something not working?</b></summary> <br> - **Run `reaper-mcp doctor`.** It checks the bridge, whether it starts with REAPER, the skills and the ClaFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @mthines/reaper-mcp@0.99.0 as of 8 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.config/REAPER/Scripts/mcp_actions_lib.lua, ~/.config/REAPER/Scripts/mcp_arrange_lib.lua, ~/.config/REAPER/Scripts/mcp_bridge.lua.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mthines: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.