quantum-gw-connection-analysis-mcp@1.5.3
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Running Connection Analysis on a Check Point gateway." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_KEYCLOUD_INFRA_TOKENPASSWORDSECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CLIENT_ID, CLOUD_CONNECTED, CLOUDINFRA_HOST, CP_MCP_MAIN_PKG, CP_MCP_STRICT_ERRORS, DEV_PORT, MANAGEMENT_DOMAIN, MANAGEMENT_HOST, MANAGEMENT_PORT, MCP_MAX_HTTP_BODY_BYTES, MCP_TRANSPORT_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE, REGION, S1C_URL, TELEMETRY_DISABLED, TELEMETRY_URL, USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso checkpoint.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names checkpoint.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY, CLOUD_INFRA_TOKEN, PASSWORD, SECRET_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 30 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"build": "npm run build:bundle && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."build:tsc": "npx tsc && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."build:tsc": "npx tsc && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."build:tsc": "npx tsc && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.constructor(authToken = "", tokenType = TokenType.API_KEY, cloudConnected = false, proxyToken) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const values = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."build": "npm run build:bundle && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."build": "npm run build:bundle && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.this.proxyToken = proxyToken;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."build:tsc": "npx tsc && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.constructor(authToken, tokenType, s1cUrl, cloudConnected = false, proxyToken) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."build": "npm run build:bundle && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.return this.tokenType === TokenType.CI_TOKEN ? this.authToken : this.proxyToken;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @chkp/quantum-gw-connection-analysis-mcp@1.5.3 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chkp: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.