Skills/npm/quantum-gw-cli-mcp

quantum-gw-cli-mcp@1.5.4

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Check Point gateway CLI commands and diagnostic tools." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher chkp · publishing for 487 daysInstalls 2,531Last detonated 34 min ago

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEYCLOUD_INFRA_TOKENPASSWORDSECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CLIENT_ID, CLOUD_CONNECTED, CLOUDINFRA_HOST, CP_MCP_MAIN_PKG, CP_MCP_STRICT_ERRORS, DEV_PORT, MANAGEMENT_DOMAIN, MANAGEMENT_HOST, MANAGEMENT_PORT, MCP_MAX_HTTP_BODY_BYTES, MCP_REQUIRE_SID, MCP_STATELESS_HTTP, MCP_TRANSPORT_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE, REGION, S1C_URL, TELEMETRY_DISABLED, TELEMETRY_URL, USERNAME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso checkpoint.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names checkpoint.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY, CLOUD_INFRA_TOKEN, PASSWORD, SECRET_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @chkp/quantum-gw-cli-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.5.3

vet-skills diff quantum-gw-cli-mcp 1.5.3 1.5.4

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.5.3 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

Only one of the two runs produced a tool list; tools are not compared.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Credential pass-through configuration; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 33 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
13sprocessdependency install exit 0
33sclaimed26 tools: dmidecode, show_asset_all, cpinfo_all, show_route, netstat_route, ip_route_show, cphaprob_stat, cphaprob_if, cphaprob_syncstat, cplic_print, show_interface, show_interfaces, fw_accel_stats, fw_accel_conns, fw_accel_stat, fw_ctl_arp, fw_ctl_chain, fw_ctl_conn, fw_ctl_cpasstat, fw_ctl_dlpkstat, fw_ctl_iflist, fw_ctl_pstat, fw_ctl_tcpstrstat, dynamic_balancing, hcp_protect_info
33stools336636cf0360f211
33stools5f4647d8cb9f5973
33stoolse18f739eceea5448
33stoolsa3732cc15731c904
33stools0bc00105499f7ba6
33stoolsba116c93b569ecce
33stools57afae691ff4b5e2
33stoolsf8b4018b1dfd419e
33stoolsb1f442456e1ea056
33stools55a7e37b1b17b5d5
33stoolsd7aa04c00509484e
33stoolsffa9b6cfdcc60f53
33stools6922fc235aecc22d
33stools5e5a2997cc322d3d
33stools6a99d02a15961ce6
33stools4519a9e93155bfe5
33stools3b57ec099463a82d
33stools4225dff85756d881
33stools6f342ab7124f7a51
33stools4c506163c57fe4b6
33stools8300ab6933e7f606
33stools6df4d0ad078309c2
33stoolsc30759afcc83a562
33stools3c5d5fe13c04cb48
33stoolseaa926f25e22658a
33stools0cfdecd3325cab42
33sprocessscript backend runs setup only
33sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/index.js:425 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst values = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build:tsc": "npx tsc && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:12 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"build:tsc": "npx tsc && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/package.json:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build:tsc": "npx tsc && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/index.js:2686 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsreturn this.tokenType === TokenType.CI_TOKEN ? this.authToken : this.proxyToken;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:10 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "npm run build:bundle && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/package.json:12 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"build:tsc": "npx tsc && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/index.js:2987 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsconstructor(authToken, tokenType, s1cUrl, cloudConnected = false, proxyToken) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/package.json:10 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"build": "npm run build:bundle && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/package.json:10 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "npm run build:bundle && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:10 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"build": "npm run build:bundle && npx shx chmod +x ./dist/index.js && npx shx cp src/server-config.json dist/",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/index.js:2668 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsconstructor(authToken = "", tokenType = TokenType.API_KEY, cloudConnected = false, proxyToken) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationdist/index.js:2672 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsthis.proxyToken = proxyToken;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 21 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈2,915 tok
26 tools · 112 per tool
Handshake
713 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 159

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chkp: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim chkpPropose a patch to the maintainer