protect-mcp@0.32.4
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Fail-closed Cedar policy gate + Ed25519 signed receipts for agent tool calls. Denies on any error." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKENACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URLE2B_API_KEYGH_TOKENGITHUB_TOKENMIN_TOKEN_LENGTHPROTECT_MCP_HTTP_TOKENPROTECT_MCP_REPORT_TOKENRESEND_API_KEYSCOPEBLIND_DEMO_AUTHORITY_KEYSCOPEBLIND_RECEIVER_PRIVATE_KEYSCOPEBLIND_TOKENSCOPEBLIND_WEBHOOK_TEMPLATESCOPEBLIND_WEBHOOK_URLSLACK_BOT_TOKENTEAMS_WEBHOOK_URLTWILIO_AUTH_TOKENor--report-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: APP_SANDBOX_CONTAINER_ID, CLAUDE_CODE_AGENT_ID, CLAUDE_CODE_AGENT_NAME, CLAUDE_CODE_SANDBOX, CLAUDE_CODE_TEAM_NAME, CODING_CONFIG, CONNECTION_CONFIG, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITHUB_EVENT_NAME, GITHUB_REF, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT, GITHUB_RUN_ID, GITHUB_WORKFLOW_REF, GITHUB_WORKFLOW_SHA, JOB_ID, NAUTILUS_BRIDGE_MODULE, NAUTILUS_TRADER_PROJECT, PMS_ADAPTER_URL, PROTECT_MCP_HTTP_HOST, PROTECT_MCP_HTTP_PORT, PROTECT_MCP_PUBLIC_KEY, PROTECT_MCP_TELEMETRY- Where it talks to
- scopeblind.com (its own)Also twilio.com, resend.com, sigstore.dev, veritasacta.com, e2b.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names twilio.com, resend.com, sigstore.dev, veritasacta.com, e2b.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN, ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL, E2B_API_KEY, GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, MIN_TOKEN_LENGTH, PROTECT_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN, PROTECT_MCP_REPORT_TOKEN, RESEND_API_KEY, SCOPEBLIND_DEMO_AUTHORITY_KEY, SCOPEBLIND_RECEIVER_PRIVATE_KEY, SCOPEBLIND_TOKEN, SCOPEBLIND_WEBHOOK_TEMPLATE, SCOPEBLIND_WEBHOOK_URL, SLACK_BOT_TOKEN, TEAMS_WEBHOOK_URL, TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN only into requests to scopeblind.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Reads credential paths from the home directory; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
' context.input.command like "*rm -fr /" || context.input.command like "*rm -fr ~" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.'@reason("Reads a credential file such as .env, ~/.ssh or ~/.aws. Ask the person for the value you need.")',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf /*" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf \\"/*" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.const denied = await callEvaluate({ tool: "Bash", input: { command: "rm -rf /" }, policy: SELF_TEST_POLICY });Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf /" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf / *" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.'@reason("Reads a credential file such as .env, ~/.ssh or ~/.aws. Ask the person for the value you need.")',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const denied = await callEvaluate({ tool: "Bash", input: { command: "rm -rf /" }, policy: SELF_TEST_POLICY });Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.details.forbidden_action = { tool: "Bash", command: "rm -rf /", allowed: denied.allowed, reason: denied.reason };Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.details.forbidden_action = { tool: "Bash", command: "rm -rf /", allowed: denied.allowed, reason: denied.reason };Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf /*" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf \\"/*" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf /" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf / *" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.' context.input.command like "*rm -fr /" || context.input.command like "*rm -fr ~" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.dangerous_command_patterns: ["rm -rf", "git push", "git reset --hard", "curl | sh", "chmod 777"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.when { ["Write", "Edit", "MultiEdit"].contains(context.tool) && context.path.contains(".env") && !context.approved };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.command like "*.docker/config.json*" || context.input.command like "*gh/hosts.yml*")',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.tradeoff: "Blocks delete_file and rm -rf / mkfs / dd. Writes are still allowed; tighten write_file later if you want.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.condition: "Bash(sudo *)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.condition: "Bash(sudo *)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.description: "Write to .env file",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.details.forbidden_action = { tool: "Bash", command: "rm -rf /", allowed: denied.allowed, reason: denied.reason };Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf /\\**" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf ~/\\**" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.' context.input.file_path like "*/.env" || context.input.file_path like "*/.env.*" ||',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…).some((p) => p === "node_modules" || p === ".git" || p === ".github" || p === ".env" || p.startsWith(".env.") || p === ".npmrc" || p === ".yarnrc" || p === ".netrc…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Allow with: npx protect-mcp policy allow ${toolName}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.' context.input.command like "*| sudo sh*" || context.input.command like "*| sudo bash*" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.const denied = await callEvaluate({ tool: "Bash", input: { command: "rm -rf /" }, policy: SELF_TEST_POLICY });Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.context.input.path like "*/.env*" ||Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Review: npx protect-mcp policy showFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.context.input.path like "*/.env*" ||Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf \\"$HOME\\"" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf \\"$HOME\\" *" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…).some((p) => p === "node_modules" || p === ".git" || p === ".github" || p === ".env" || p.startsWith(".env.") || p === ".npmrc" || p === ".yarnrc" || p === ".netrc…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.context.input.path like "*/.env*" ||Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.tradeoff: "Blocks delete_file and rm -rf / mkfs / dd. Writes are still allowed; tighten write_file later if you want.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.w(` See your record npx protect-mcp recordFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.{ tool: "Bash", input: {}, context: { command: "rm -rf /project/build" }, label: "Run rm -rf", expect: "deny" }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.${dim("A running gate (protect-mcp serve) hot-reloads on this change; no restart needed. The one-shot hook path re-reads per call.")}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…ltDeny ? ` No permit matched (default-deny, fail-closed).${policyRef} Allow it: npx protect-mcp policy allow ${toolName}` : ` Blocked by the forbid rule ${sentence(named)}${po…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.condition: "Write(*.env)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…).some((p) => p === "node_modules" || p === ".git" || p === ".github" || p === ".env" || p.startsWith(".env.") || p === ".npmrc" || p === ".yarnrc" || p === ".netrc…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.{ cap: "secret.adjacent", text: /\.env\b|secret|credential|passwd|password|api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|\.pem\b|\.key\b|id_rsa|bearer\s|aws_(access|secret)|authorization/ },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…).some((p) => p === "node_modules" || p === ".git" || p === ".github" || p === ".env" || p.startsWith(".env.") || p === ".npmrc" || p === ".yarnrc" || p === ".netrc…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf /" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf / *" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.'@reason("Reads a credential file such as .env, ~/.ssh or ~/.aws. Ask the person for the value you need.")',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.file_path like "*/.docker/config.json" || context.input.file_path like "*/.kube/config" ||',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.context.input.path like "*/.netrc*" ||Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf /\\**" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf ~/\\**" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.{ tool: "read_file", input: { path: "/home/analyst/.env" }, label: "Read a secrets file (.env)", expect: "deny" },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf \\"$HOME\\"" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf \\"$HOME\\" *" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.' context.input.command like "*rm -rf /" || context.input.command like "*rm -rf / *" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.const denied = await callEvaluate({ tool: "Bash", input: { command: "rm -rf /" }, policy: SELF_TEST_POLICY });Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.description: "Edit .env file",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.details.forbidden_action = { tool: "Bash", command: "rm -rf /", allowed: denied.allowed, reason: denied.reason };Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…).some((p) => p === "node_modules" || p === ".git" || p === ".github" || p === ".env" || p.startsWith(".env.") || p === ".npmrc" || p === ".yarnrc" || p === ".netrc…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.{ cap: "secret.adjacent", text: /\.env\b|secret|credential|passwd|password|api[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|\.pem\b|\.key\b|id_rsa|bearer\s|aws_(access|secret)|authorization/ },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.protected_paths: [".env", ".ssh", "keys/", "secrets/", "node_modules/"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.{ tool: "Read", input: { file_path: "/project/.env" }, label: "Read the .env file", expect: "deny" },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.command like "*| sudo sh*" || context.input.command like "*| sudo bash*" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.' context.input.command like "*| sudo -E bash*" || context.input.command like "*sh <(curl*" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.condition: "Edit(*.env)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.'@reason("Reads a credential file such as .env, ~/.ssh or ~/.aws. Ask the person for the value you need.")',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.file_path like "*/.env" || context.input.file_path like "*/.env.*" ||',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.' context.input.command like "*| sudo -E bash*" || context.input.command like "*sh <(curl*" ||',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.out(` Check a call: ${dim(`npx protect-mcp@${version} evaluate --policy ./protect.cedar --tool Bash --input '{"command":"git push --force origin main"}'`)}`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.' context.input.file_path like "*/.claude/settings.json" || context.input.file_path like "*/.claude/settings.local.json" ||',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.npx --yes @veritasacta/[email protected] --replay-chain .protect-mcp-receipts.jsonl --key "$PROTECT_MCP_PUBLIC_KEY" --jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.verifier: "npx @veritasacta/verify",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.dangerous_command_patterns: ["rm -rf", "git push", "git reset --hard", "curl | sh", "chmod 777"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npx protect-mcp dashboard Local-only dashboard (127.0.0.1; no account)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.add("warn", "Signing key permissions allow access by other users. Restrict this file to its owner (chmod 600).", "key_permissions");Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* npx protect-mcp report --period 30d --format md --output report.mdFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx protect-mcp connect Connect privacy-safe summaries to ScopeBlindFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.warnings.push(`signing: key file ${config.key_path} is open to other users (mode ${fileMode.toString(8).padStart(3, "0")}); run: chmod 600 ${config.key_path}`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* npx protect-mcp export-hf --output dataset.jsonl --format parquetFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.if (!contain) out(` Keep writes inside this folder too: ${dim(`npx protect-mcp@${version} init --starter --contain --force`)} (rewrites protect.cedar)`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const launch = `npx --yes ${AGENT_PACKAGE_URL} coordination --config ${shellQuote(configPath)}`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx protect-mcp export-hf --output dataset.jsonlFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.' context.input.file_path like "*/.cursor/hooks.json" || context.input.file_path like "*/.cursor/protect-mcp.json" ||',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.' context.input.command like "*.docker/config.json*" || context.input.command like "*gh/hosts.yml*")',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const launch = `npx --yes ${AGENT_PACKAGE_URL} coordination agent --profile ${shellQuote(profilePath)}`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.condition: "Bash(chmod -R *)",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.context.command like "*chmod -R 777*" ||Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* // Then: c2patool output.jpg -m manifest.json -o signed-output.jpgFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.condition: "Bash(chmod -R *)",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.node receiver.cjs "$OPERATION" --config receiver-config.json --task "$TASK_ID" --output repository-evidence.jsonFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.npx protect-mcp bundle --output audit-bundle.jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.w(` See your record npx protect-mcp recordFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.' context.input.file_path like "*/.cursor/hooks.json" || context.input.file_path like "*/.cursor/protect-mcp.json" ||',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.node receiver.cjs ready --connection connection-config.json --output repository-evidence.jsonFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.dangerous_command_patterns: ["rm -rf", "git push", "git reset --hard", "curl | sh", "chmod 777"],Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.' context.input.file_path like "*/.claude/settings.json" || context.input.file_path like "*/.claude/settings.local.json" ||',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.warnings.push(`signing: key file ${config.key_path} is open to other users (mode ${fileMode.toString(8).padStart(3, "0")}); run: chmod 600 ${config.key_path}`);Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.* npx protect-mcp report --period 30d --output report.jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.For signed receipts, run ${dim("npx protect-mcp init")} first.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx protect-mcp simulate --policy strict.json [--log .protect-mcp-log.jsonl] [--json]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx @veritasacta/verify receipt.jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.condition: "Bash(chmod 777 *)",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.context.command like "*chown -R*"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.npx protect-mcp bundle --output audit-bundle.jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.verify_command: "npx @veritasacta/verify audit-bundle.json --bundle"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.' context.input.file_path like "*/keys/gateway.json" || context.input.file_path like "*/../*")',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.* Shipped with `npx protect-mcp init-hooks` and customizable by the user.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.condition: "Bash(chmod 777 *)",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Allow with: npx protect-mcp policy allow ${toolName}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.' context.input.file_path like "*/keys/gateway.json" || context.input.file_path like "*/../*")',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…((w) => "- " + w).join("\n")} ## Review before installing 1. Keep receiver-key.json private; never upload the setup directory, private key, GitHub token, or an environment file to Scope…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Next: run \`npx protect-mcp dashboard --open\` and review tool inventory, policy coverage, approvals, and receipts.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…ltDeny ? ` No permit matched (default-deny, fail-closed).${policyRef} Allow it: npx protect-mcp policy allow ${toolName}` : ` Blocked by the forbid rule ${sentence(named)}${po…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx --yes @veritasacta/[email protected] --replay-chain .protect-mcp-receipts.jsonl --key "$PROTECT_MCP_PUBLIC_KEY" --jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…nst the receipt committed_fields_root; fields not disclosed remain hidden. CLI: npx @veritasacta/verify bundle.json --bundle` } }; } function collectSignedReceipts(logs) { ret…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Review: npx protect-mcp policy showFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…ss without a new connection, run repository ready --connection connection-config.json --key-file PRIVATE_KEY_FILE --output new-readiness.json. `; } export { REPOSITORY_SETUP_VERSION, discoverReposi…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.' context.input.file_path like "*/.docker/config.json" || context.input.file_path like "*/.kube/config" ||',Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.node receiver.cjs "$OPERATION" --config receiver-config.json --task "$TASK_ID" --output repository-evidence.jsonFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.out(dim(" Re-verify the whole pack yourself with the open verifier: npx @veritasacta/verify " + bundlePath + " --bundle"));Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…((w) => "- " + w).join("\n")} ## Review before installing 1. Keep receiver-key.json private; never upload the setup directory, private key, GitHub token, or an environment file to Scope…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.node receiver.cjs ready --connection connection-config.json --output repository-evidence.jsonFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.…ss without a new connection, run repository ready --connection connection-config.json --key-file PRIVATE_KEY_FILE --output new-readiness.json. `; } var REPOSITORY_SETUP_VERSION, REPO, WORKFLOW_PATH, saf…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for protect-mcp@0.32.4 as of 55 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim scopeblind: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.