Skills/npm/prompt-capability-optimizer

prompt-capability-optimizer@1.0.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Production-grade, cross-platform agent meta-skill for autonomous capability discovery & two-pass prompt optimization." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher mahmoud-abdulhamid · joined 6 days agoInstalls 18Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-28 and scored it 53/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Authorization escalation language; Prompt injection attempt. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageprompt_capability_optimizer/discovery/find_skills_adapter.py:135 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageprompt_capability_optimizer/verification/verification_engine.py:62 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedprompt_capability_optimizer/discovery/find_skills_adapter.py:64 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsprompt_capability_optimizer/security/injection_detector.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageprompt_capability_optimizer/discovery/find_skills_adapter.py:7 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Authorization escalation languagereferences/security_and_trust.md:34 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptreferences/security_and_trust.md:34 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedprompt_capability_optimizer/discovery/find_skills_adapter.py:32 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionreferences/security_and_trust.md:34 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptSKILL.md:151 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptREADME.md:153 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

What would make this Verified

27 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mahmoud-abdulhamid: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim mahmoud-abdulhamid