premiere-mcp-imt@1.3.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Premiere-MCP-IMT + SKILLS — MCP server and agent skills for Adobe Premiere Pro. Works with every UI language Adobe ships and sees the frame: the agent draws Object Masks on the people or parts it sees (a click for a whole person, a lasso for a face; add, " Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PREMIERE_UXP_TOKENTIMECODE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: AUDIO_KEYFRAME_READBACK, MCPB_SKIP_BUILD, npm_execpath, PASTE_ATTRIBUTES_MAX_KEYS_PER_PROPERTY, PR_MCP_FACADE, PREMIERE_DEFAULT_SEQUENCE_PRESET, PREMIERE_MCP_DEBUG, PREMIERE_MCP_PROTOCOL_MODE, PREMIERE_MCP_TRANSPORT, PREMIERE_TEMP_DIR, PREMIERE_TIMEOUT_MS, PREMIERE_UXP_PORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso adobe.com, purl.org, iptc.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names adobe.com, purl.org, iptc.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PREMIERE_UXP_TOKEN, TIMECODE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 9 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
+ "Install the signed MCPBridgeCEP.zxp from the GitHub release, or run `npx -y premiere-pro-mcp --install-cep`.");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.run(`npx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb pack "${STAGING}" "${outFile}"`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.run(`npx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb validate "${join(STAGING, "manifest.json")}"`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @immersive-media-technologies/premiere-mcp-imt@1.3.1 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.