Skills/npm/posterly-mcp-server

posterly-mcp-server@0.62.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for posterly: schedule and publish social media posts across 18 platforms from any MCP client (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor, Windsurf, Cline, and more)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher awpthorp · publishing for 255 daysInstalls 5,315Last detonated 5 min ago
$claude mcp add posterly-mcp-server -- npx -y posterly-mcp-server
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
POSTERLY_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: POSTERLY_API_BASE_URL, POSTERLY_DIRECTORY_PROFILE, POSTERLY_TOOLSETS, POSTERLY_URL
Where it talks to
poster.ly (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for POSTERLY_API_KEY and talks to poster.ly. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets POSTERLY_API_KEY=poster.ly -- npx -y posterly-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 27 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.7sprocessdependency install exit 0
27sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-LwYh0P/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/posterly-mcp-server/dist/lib/claude-directory-profile.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
27sprocessscript backend runs setup only
27sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/tools/whoami.js:165 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codereturn `update available: restart the MCP client or run ${code('npx -y posterly-mcp-server@latest')}`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

No other findings across 17,165 lines in 81 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈79 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for posterly-mcp-server@0.62.0 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.