play-store-kit@1.0.2
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "A Claude skill that takes an Android app to Google Play and keeps it there: artifact pre-check against Play requirements, signed App Bundle upload, review, staged rollout and recovery through the official Google Play Developer API, every live effect behin" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build.py:222 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build.py:384 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05CRITICAL
Prompt injectionreferences/genai-policy.md:73 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build.py:398 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/install.js:28 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build.py:590 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/validate_kit.py:292 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/precheck.py:271 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/build.py:470 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim allexp1: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim allexp1