Skills/npm/pilotfish-mcp

pilotfish-mcp@0.1.62

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Give any MCP agent a real Chrome on your own computer. Free, no account, no API key. mcprush.com-ba6a69f5121bd8a0089bb26a" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher gaiventures · publishing for 13 daysInstalls 13,211Last detonated 10 min ago

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PILOTFISH_MCP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: DISPLAY, PILOTFISH_ADBLOCK_OFFLINE, PILOTFISH_MCP_DEBUG_LOG, PILOTFISH_MODEL
Where it talks to
gai.ventures (its own)Also easylist.to, adblockplus.org, pages.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names easylist.to, adblockplus.org, pages.dev as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PILOTFISH_MCP_TOKEN only into requests to gai.ventures (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets PILOTFISH_MCP_TOKEN=gai.ventures -- npx -y @gaiventures/pilotfish-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 30 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
9.5sprocessdependency install exit 0
30sclaimed16 tools: browser_navigate, browser_snapshot, browser_click, browser_type, browser_select, browser_press, browser_scroll, browser_screenshot, browser_get_text, browser_query, browser_find, browser_actions, browser_resume, browser_wait, browser_tabs, browser_close
30stools8d73193923a97ec5
30stoolsb434f34e0653fc52
30stoolsd3c0c794f0db0a44
30stools49dde6030b3cc7d0
30stoolsb21c45e550baa555
30stools57721d99bc12aa83
30stools04a9db74cdb14fc4
30stoolsf14eef23a227c8bc
30stoolsd767ac1d4beec297
30stools98d130da3e1648b6
30stools1f7711c2f86a2697
30stools174702375d8e5852
30stools11b92b0dd1f5120a
30stools96e75de8107e36fb
30stools8be5fa3cd047687c
30stoolse0d2d435cb14c6d6
30sprocessscript backend runs setup only
30sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecli.js:113 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…ound. Set PILOTFISH_CHROME, pass executablePath, install Google Chrome, or run `npx playwright install chromium`.");let i=null,r=s.userAgent?void 0:e?.userAgent?.(s);r&&(i=(a…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioncli.js:378 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… recallRefs(e){let t=this.turnSnapshot??this.lastSnapshot;if(!t)return;let s=[...JSON.stringify(e).matchAll(/"\w*ref"\s*:\s*"((?:f\d+)?e\d+)"/g)].map(r=>r[1]),o=new Set(t.refMemory.values());if(!s.some(r=>!t.byRef.has(r)&&!this.lastSnapsho…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscli.js:113 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…e","pipe","pipe"],env:{...process.env,...s.timezoneId?{TZ:s.timezoneId}:{},...h?.env??{},...d.env??{}},detached:process.platform!=="win32"})}catch(_){throw await t.…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)cli.js:509 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…l):null);return e?(this.reset(),await e.close().catch(()=>{}),!0):!1})}};import{McpServer as Jp}from"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";import{ListToolsRequestSchema as Xp}from"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";import{z as X}from"z…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandcli.js:114 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges…buntu-24.04 runners) unprivileged user namespaces are blocked by AppArmor: run `sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0`, or install an AppArmo…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedcli.js:182 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads…)?)\b`,"\u0915\u0941\u091B \u0917\u0932\u0924 \u0939\u094B \u0917\u092F\u093E","\u30A8\u30E9\u30FC\u304C\u767A\u751F\u3057\u307E\u3057\u305F","\u554F\u984C\u304C\u767A\u751F\u3057\u307E\u3057\u305F","\u51FA\u9519\u4E86|\…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecli.js:114 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…hile loading shared libraries/i.test(s)&&o.push("Missing system libraries: run `npx playwright install-deps chromium` or use the provided Docker image."),/Missing X server|ca…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actioncli.js:136 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…gth)continue;let g=f.filter(O=>bi.has(O)),b=m.map(O=>{let T=h(O,w);return T?Math.log(1+o.length/T):0}),k=b.reduce((O,T)=>O+T,0);if(!k)continue;let _=[];for(let O of o){let T=r(O),E=m.map(P=>d(P,O,w));if(!E.some(P=>P>0))continue;let D=E.eve…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈70 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈4,361 tok
16 tools · 273 per tool
Handshake
925 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 328

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim gaiventures: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim gaiventuresPropose a patch to the maintainer