pi-skill-tauri-django-react@0.2.3
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Agents should invoke this skill for Tauri + Django + React desktop apps, especially backend lifecycle, CORS/auth, frontend integration, build packaging, dual desktop/web deployment, Rust commands, and platform-specific gotchas." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 0.2.2
vet-skills diff pi-skill-tauri-django-react 0.2.2 0.2.3This version reaches for something 0.2.2 did not: 3 new hosts (githubusercontent.com, ipc.localhost, tauri.localhost). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- githubusercontent.com, ipc.localhost, tauri.localhost
0.2.2 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
- `load_dotenv()` makes `.env` values available via `option_env!()` macros (e.g., updater PAT)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.fix="Run chmod +x scripts/start.sh",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.kill "$backend_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if [[ -n "$backend_pid" ]] && kill -0 "$backend_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM", "scripts/start.sh traps EXIT/INT/TERM for cleanup", "Trap EXIT, INT, and TERM and kill child processes"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.| Environment | `.env.example` | Documents `APP_UPDATE_SOURCE_PATH`, `APP_CONFIG_PATH`, installer-pattern overrides, and updater/signing env vars |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if [[ -n "$backend_pid" ]] && kill -0 "$backend_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.let env_path = repo_root.join(".env");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.kill "$frontend_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.fix="Run chmod +x scripts/release.sh",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.echo "body_path=/tmp/release_body.txt" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.(".env.example", _tmpl_env_example(ctx)),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.("kill", "scripts/start.sh stops child processes", "Track backend/frontend PIDs and kill them in cleanup()"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.env_text = "\n".join(read_text(p) for p in [root / ".env.example", root / "frontend" / ".env.example"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.root / ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.os.startfile(str(installer)) # type: ignore[attr-defined]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.kill "$backend_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$frontend_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- **Windows:** Must use `taskkill /F /T /PID` to kill the entire process tree (PyInstaller spawns child processes)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if [[ -n "$frontend_pid" ]] && kill -0 "$frontend_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.fix="Document APP_UPDATE_SOURCE_PATH in .env.example for local/network update-source configuration",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- be executable (`chmod +x scripts/start.sh`).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.root / ".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if [[ -n "$frontend_pid" ]] && kill -0 "$frontend_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.("GITHUB_TOKEN", "release workflow uses GITHUB_TOKEN for publishing", "Pass secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN to the release publishing step"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @firstpick/pi-skill-tauri-django-react@0.2.3 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim firstpick: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.