Skills/npm/pi-skill-tauri-django-react

pi-skill-tauri-django-react@0.2.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Agents should invoke this skill for Tauri + Django + React desktop apps, especially backend lifecycle, CORS/auth, frontend integration, build packaging, dual desktop/web deployment, Rust commands, and platform-specific gotchas." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher firstpick · publishing for 184 daysInstalls 84Last detonated 56 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.2.2

vet-skills diff pi-skill-tauri-django-react 0.2.2 0.2.3

This version reaches for something 0.2.2 did not: 3 new hosts (githubusercontent.com, ipc.localhost, tauri.localhost). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
githubusercontent.com, ipc.localhost, tauri.localhost

0.2.2 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 2: scaffold.py: error: the following arguments are required: --project-root, --app-name, --app-id
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 2: validate.py: error: the following arguments are required: --project-root
0.1sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/tauri-django-react/SKILL.md:652 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `load_dotenv()` makes `.env` values available via `option_env!()` macros (e.g., updater PAT)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/validate.py:1184 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfix="Run chmod +x scripts/start.sh",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/scaffold.py:1527 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$backend_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/SKILL.md:88 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [[ -n "$backend_pid" ]] && kill -0 "$backend_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/validate.py:1195 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes("trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM", "scripts/start.sh traps EXIT/INT/TERM for cleanup", "Trap EXIT, INT, and TERM and kill child processes"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/tauri-django-react/SKILL.md:1059 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| Environment | `.env.example` | Documents `APP_UPDATE_SOURCE_PATH`, `APP_CONFIG_PATH`, installer-pattern overrides, and updater/signing env vars |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/scaffold.py:1526 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [[ -n "$backend_pid" ]] && kill -0 "$backend_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/scaffold.py:281 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslet env_path = repo_root.join(".env");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/scaffold.py:1524 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$frontend_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/validate.py:1288 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfix="Run chmod +x scripts/release.sh",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/scaffold.py:1790 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesecho "body_path=/tmp/release_body.txt" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/scaffold.py:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(".env.example", _tmpl_env_example(ctx)),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/validate.py:1196 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes("kill", "scripts/start.sh stops child processes", "Track backend/frontend PIDs and kill them in cleanup()"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/validate.py:973 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_text = "\n".join(read_text(p) for p in [root / ".env.example", root / "frontend" / ".env.example"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/validate.py:1093 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesroot / ".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/scaffold.py:936 · Python subprocess execution detectedos.startfile(str(installer)) # type: ignore[attr-defined]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/SKILL.md:89 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$backend_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/SKILL.md:86 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$frontend_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/SKILL.md:227 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes- **Windows:** Must use `taskkill /F /T /PID` to kill the entire process tree (PyInstaller spawns child processes)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/scaffold.py:1523 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [[ -n "$frontend_pid" ]] && kill -0 "$frontend_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/validate.py:980 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfix="Document APP_UPDATE_SOURCE_PATH in .env.example for local/network update-source configuration",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandskills/tauri-django-react/SKILL.md:62 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- be executable (`chmod +x scripts/start.sh`).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/scaffold.py:938 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/validate.py:1094 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesroot / ".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandskills/tauri-django-react/SKILL.md:85 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [[ -n "$frontend_pid" ]] && kill -0 "$frontend_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationskills/tauri-django-react/scripts/validate.py:1252 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials("GITHUB_TOKEN", "release workflow uses GITHUB_TOKEN for publishing", "Pass secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN to the release publishing step"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈11,621 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @firstpick/pi-skill-tauri-django-react@0.2.3 as of 21 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim firstpick: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim firstpickPropose a patch to the maintainer